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ABSTRACT 
The banks are a dominant component of the Tanzanian Financial System; they are 
engines of growth of Tanzanian economy. The board of directors, in today corporate, 
assumed responsibility for devising corporate strategy, evaluating managerial 
performance, providing strategic direction, putting corporate governance policies in 
place and ensuring an adequate return for the shareholders. The size and composition 
of the board of directors constitute of the most essential corporate governance norms. 
This study made to attempt assessing the performance of listed banks and the 
relationship with board size, composition of board members, committee meetings, 
bank age and board meetings. The collapse of major corporations such as Enron, 
Worldcom and Parmala has stimulated the recent interest in corporate governance 
and suggest the need for policies to promote the effective, powerful, and balanced 
board compositions and other aspects of corporate governance.  With that in mind, in 
this study, I would like to answer the following research question: “What is the 
relationship between board compositions and bank performance, measured by 
ordinary least square (OLS) on three listed banks at the DSE?” In order to examine 
if there is a relationship between board composition and financial performance, I 
have done Descriptive and Multiple Regression analyses. Based on the results I can 
state that there is little evidence to suggest a linear positive or negative relationship 
between board composition and bank performance since the results show that the 
independent variables have negative relationship with return on assets and no 
significant impact on return on equity. Other results show a positive and negative 
relationship between independent variables with dependent variables. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Research Problem 
Over the past years, a new wave of bank privatizations has significantly altered bank 
ownership structure in many countries. While governments have reduced their 
ownership stakes in banks, foreigners, and, to a lesser extent, large domestic block 
holders, including local companies and individuals, have stepped in. Consequently, 
the banking sector has experienced major transformations in its operating 
environment. Therefore, an efficient banking sector is better able to withstand 
negative shocks and contribute to the stability of the financial system. 
 
The Board of Directors has long been recognized as an important corporate 
governance mechanism for aligning the interests of managers and all stakeholders to 
the firm. Corporate Governance plays a big role in the maximization of shareholders’ 
wealth; therefore good corporate governance is important in order to increase the 
market value of a firm while higher financial leverage decreases a firm value by 
increasing bankruptcy risks (Sheifer and Vishny, 1997). Sound corporate governance 
mechanisms help assure investors that they will get their capital back and receive an 
adequate return on their investment. 
 
Oman et al. (2003) argue that different forms of composition structures of the boards 
are associated with different sets of agency problems. In countries such as US and 
the UK where share ownership is widely diffused, agency problem is more common 
between managers and shareholders. In contrast, in developing countries 
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characterized with concentrated equity ownership, agency problem is most 
predominant between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Thus, 
strengthening board composition and other forms of firm level governance is 
important, and particularly so in developing countries with weak institutions that 
need to attract foreign resources. 
 
Beyond helping to resolve agency problems between managers and other 
stakeholders, corporate governance is important to the economy (Levina, 2004; and 
Oman et al., 2003). In developing countries with weak legal redress when the 
developing country partner violates a contractual agreement (Collier, 2006), it could 
be argued that strengthening board structure and other firm level mechanisms of 
corporate governance could serve as a means of ameliorating the weakness of legal 
institutions and hence aid the attraction of foreign investment, with significant 
ramifications to the economy.  
 
Levine (2004) also sees a link between corporate governance and the economy, 
arguing that it has the capacity to foster economic growth. According to him, sound 
corporate governance makes it more likely for owners of capital to monitor the 
activities of managers either directly or through voting on crucial matters or 
indirectly through the board of directors. This helps to protect shareholders interest, 
promote savings, investment and economic growth. Oman et al (2003) argue along 
similar lines, but see the importance of corporate governance on growth through a 
different channel. For them, well – governed firms are better able to raise 
productivity and aid economic growth. 
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Financial sector reforms in Tanzania began slowly in the 1984/85 but were 
intensified in 1986 by the Economic Recovery Program (ERP). The objectives of 
ERP (among others) were to direct more credit to the private sector. A presidential 
commission of enquiry into the monetary and banking system in Tanzania was also 
established in 1988, and a Banking and Financial Institutions Act was passed in 
1991. This geared to effect financial sector reform through the restructuring of the 
existing financial institutions, to promote banking and strengthen the legislative and 
supervisory powers of the central bank. As from 1992, all banks and financial 
institutions (domestic and foreign) were now free to enter the banking market. 
Foreign banks were allowed to enter into the banking system through opening 
branches, representative offices, or by acquiring shares of local banks.  
 
Experiences from developing countries have shown that bank’s performance may 
vary across nations or between banks. Banking industry in Tanzania is open to entry 
and therefore it is highly contestable. What is still cloaked is the extent to which 
board composition affects banks’ performance in Tanzania. This study examines the 
effect of board composition on banks’ performance in the three banks listed at the 
DSE. And it is motivated by the gap that exists in the literature. The performance 
analysis of the banking sector has recently emerged as an important research trend. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
Banks’ versatile role in the economic system has caught regulatory and supervisory 
interest around the world in an effort to inspire high quality corporate governance 
standards. Board composition, in the sense of board composition, and its impact on 
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corporate performance constitutes an indisputable and, at the same time, prevalent 
theme of the corporate governance discussion. 
 
Banks are different from other corporate in important respects, and that makes 
corporate governance of banks not only different but also more critical. Banks 
lubricate the wheels of real economy, are the conduits of monetary policy 
transmission and constitute the economy’s payment and settlement system. By the 
very nature of their business, banks are highly leveraged. Banks are interconnected in 
diverse, complex and oftentimes opaque ways underscoring theirs ‘’contagion’’ 
potential. If a bank fails, the impact can spread rapidly through to other banks with 
potentially serious consequences for the entire financial system and the macro 
economy.  
 
A series of structural reforms raised the profile and importance of corporate 
governance in banks. 
 
The “composition’’ reforms measures included mandating a higher proportion of 
independent directors on the boards; inducting board members with diverse sets of 
skills and expertise; and setting up of board committees for key functions like Audit 
and risk compliances, strategy and innovation, credit, governance management and 
human resources and nomination.  
 
The collapse of major corporations such as Enron, WorldCom and the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (BCCI) in the UK and US has stimulated the recent 
5 
interest in corporate governance and suggest the need for policies to promote the 
effective, powerful, and balanced boards and other aspects of corporate    
governance.  
 
The Asian economic crisis also has contributed to the raising profile of corporate 
governance. In East African Community (EAC), governance has been debated in the 
context of state ownership of corporations where corruption, mismanagement and 
government subsidization of failing enterprises have been the defining features. 
There has been an attempt to address corporate governance challenges in EAC by the 
privatization policy and the capital markets authorities. There has also been a 
worldwide effort to improve the effectives of corporate governance.  
 
The issues that have stimulated interests in the phenomenon of corporate governance, 
point to particular causes of governance crises. These include weak legal and 
regulatory systems, inconsistent accounting and auditing standards, poor banking 
practices. The ineffective oversight by corporate boards of directors, and little regard 
for the rights of minority shareholders are also problems with respect to corporate 
governance (World Bank, 2000). Most of the studies were done in developed 
economies therefore contextual differences may yield different results, findings and 
conclusions of these studies may not apply to firms operating in Tanzania.  
 
This study therefore attempted to see the analysis of board composition and financial 
performance, a case of three banks listed (i.e CRDB, NMB and DCB) at the Dar  es 
Salaam Stock Exchange.  
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1.3 Research Objectives 
1.3.1 Main Research Objective 
The main research objective of this study focused on the analysis of board 
composition of the selected banks listed at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock Exchange 
and their performance. 
 
1.3.2 Specific Objectives  
The research aims to; 
i) Examine whether there is a significant relationship between board 
composition and financial performance. 
ii) Analyze the good combination of board members which will come with high 
performance with respect to three selected banks listed at the Dar –es – 
Salaam Stock Exchange. 
iii) Evaluate the effect of board meetings related to financial performance of the 
banks listed at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock Exchange.  
 
1.4 Research Questions  
i) What is the relationship between board composition and bank performance? 
ii) What is the good combination of board composition which will turn to a high 
corporate governance hence high performance of the bank?  
iii) What are the effects of annual board meetings related to the financial 
performance? 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
Banks play pivotal role in reshaping economy of a country by mobilizing necessary  
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funds for businesses and helping in generating employment, promoting economic 
activity, improving corporate governance and consequently fostering economic 
growth. Therefore, well – governed banking sector would help businesses flourish 
and poorly governed banking sector would retard progress. 
 
Thus, the findings of this study had great importance and benefits to diverse 
stakeholders including shareholders, investors, researchers and academicians as 
follows: 
a) To shareholders; the study has given the direction to shareholders on the 
important of board composition of executive and non – executive directors in 
their firm in order to attain high financial performance.  
b) To the investors; this study has answered the dilemma questions by investors 
on where to invest in long run performance expectation since the composition 
of executive and non – executive directors related to the financial 
performance of banks can be applied even on other firms. 
c) To academic research; the study is important to them since it has suggested 
other researchable topics on related topics understudy from other listed and 
non – listed companies at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock Exchange, to facilitate 
the continuation of conducting more research in the related field of study. 
 
1.6 Organization of the Study 
The study is organized in five chapters; where each chapter states its contents. 
However, all contents found in each chapter have significant relationship to each 
other. Chapter one is all about background to the research problem, statement of the 
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research problem, research objectives, research questions, significance of the study 
and the organization of the study. Chapter two is about literature review, which 
comprises of overview, conceptual definitions, theoretical literature review, 
empirical literature review, policy review, research gap and conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks. Chapter three concerned with research methodology 
showing the overview of the study, research design, areas of the study, population of 
the study, sampling design and sample size, variables and measurement procedures, 
data collection methods. In additional, the chapter presents; data collection tools, 
reliability and validity of data, data processing and analysis, ethical considerations 
and expected research findings. 
 
Chapter four makes interpretation of data, analysis and discussion of the findings. 
Finally chapter five present summary of the findings and their implications, 
conclusion, recommendation, limitation of the study and suggested areas for further 
studies.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Overview 
This section reviewed the study on the related field, acknowledgement the 
contribution made by various scholars publication, business journals, text and 
periodicals, its identifies the gap and provide the way forward, a critical review is 
done to identify gaps, thereafter a summary is made on the study. The part has 
subdivided into five parts, the conceptual definitions, theoretical literature review, 
empirical literature review, policy review, research gap and the conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks. 
 
2.2 Conceptual Definitions  
The concept “corporate governance” has attracted various definitions. Metrick and 
Ishii (2002) define corporate governance from the perspective of the investor as 
“both the promise to repay a fair return on capital invested and the commitment to 
operate a firm, efficiently given investment”. Cadbury Committee (1992) defines 
corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled”. Zingales (1998) also defines a governance system as “the complex set of 
constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi rent registered by the 
firm”. 
 
According to Mayer (1997), corporate governance is concerned with ways of 
bringing the interests of (investors and managers) into line and ensuring that firms 
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are run for the benefit of investors. Corporate governance is concerned with the 
relationship between the internal governance mechanisms of corporations and 
society’s conception of the scope of corporate accountability (Deakin and Hughes, 
1997). It has also been defined by Keasey et al (1997) to include ‘the structures, 
processes, cultures and systems that engender the successful operation of 
organisations.’ Corporate governance is also seen as the whole set of measures taken 
within the social entity that is an enterprise to favour the economic agents to take part 
in the productive process, in order to generate some organizational surplus, and to set 
up a fair distribution between the partners, taking into consideration what they have 
brought to the organization (Maati, 1999). 
 
Zingales (1998) defines corporate governance as a group of mechanisms used by 
stakeholders to ensure that directors efficiently manage corporate resources, a task 
that includes the manner in which quasi rents are developed and distributed.  
According to Thomsen and Conyon, the board of directors is a group of people, who 
are elected by the shareholders and are responsible for the strategy of a company, 
hiring or firing CEO or management team, evaluating a company’s performance with 
the help of financial statements and deciding on number of issues like manager’s 
compensation and auditing (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012, p.142). Earlier the issue of 
power has been discussed in Mizruchi work (1983). Mainly, the author has 
questioned whether management or board dominates each other. It was believed that 
even though the board has a power to hire and fire the managers in reality 
management dominates board. Mizruchi came to a conclusion that board of directors 
would dismiss the CEO only in case if the performance of the company fails to meet 
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their expectations. Moreover, Mizruchi argues that board of directors has a control 
over long-term goals of the company whereas the management is dealing with daily 
affairs and often board of directors is not familiar with technical aspects of 
company’s operations (Mizruchi, 1983, p. 433). 
 
Corporate governance generally refers to the set of mechanisms that influence 
decisions made by managers when there is a separation of ownership and control. As 
discussed above, some of the independent variables used as measures of corporate 
governance are Executive Directors, Non – Executive Director, Committee Meeting, 
Board size, Board Meetings and Bank Age.  
 
Though, corporate governance is considered to involve a set of complex indicators 
which face substantial measurement error due to the complex nature of the 
interaction between governance variables and performance indicators, the purpose of 
this study is to examine the influence of selected corporate governance variables 
namely Executive Directors (ED), Non – Executive Directors (NED), Committee 
Meetings, Board Size, Board Meetings and Bank Age have on performance variables 
of profitability (ROA, ROE, GPM and NPM), efficiency (NIM and OER) and capital 
adequacy (E/Li, LA/Li). The variables are carefully chosen because of data 
availability and measurement. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Literature Review 
In this section of theoretical literature review, the study mainly discussed the issues 
of the subject matter in line with the past studies done by other scholars under the 
guideline of the research objectives. 
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The literature on the relation between board structure (as a corporate governance 
device) and bank financial performance has registered significant growth, buoyed 
mainly by studies from developed, and to a lesser extent some developing, countries. 
The first element of board characteristics is concerning its composition. A board 
comprising a reasonable proportion of executive and non – executive directors is 
more likely to be independent of management than one dominated by executive 
directors, and therefore more likely to protect the interest of other stakeholders. The 
importance of non – executive directors has been recognized even at the level of 
policy, with codes of corporate governance giving a special attention to the need to 
have a reasonable proportion of them on the board of directors of the firms. 
 
It is widely debated in the corporate governance literature as to whether board 
composition in the form of representation of outside independent directors may add 
any economic value to the firm (Kesner et al., 1986); Hermalin and Weisbach, 
(2003); Petra, (2005). Prior research on board composition mainly focused on firms 
in advanced economies (Guest, 2008). Studies for example by Kaplan and Reishus 
(1990), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Brickley et al. (1994), and Beasley (1996) found 
a positive impact from appointing outside independent directors onto the board. 
Kesner et al. (1986) found that, although independent directors are not involved in 
illegal acts, adding outside independent directors cannot lessen a firm’s illegal acts. 
Fernandes (2005) documented that the firms with non-executive directors have less 
agency problems and have a better alignment of shareholders and managers’ 
interests.  
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2.4 Empirical Literature Review 
In this section of empirical literature review, the study mainly discussed the issues of 
the subject matter in line with the past studies done by other scholars under the 
guideline of the research objectives. These studies have been divided into three 
parties namely; empirical literature review worldwide, Africa and Tanzania. 
 
2.4.1 Empirical Literature Review Worldwide 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) show that the firm share price goes up when an 
additional outside director is appointed. Denis and Sarin (1999), in a study using a 
time-series analysis over a 10-year period, found that the changes in ownership and 
board structure are correlated with one another. Changes in ownership and board 
structure are strongly related to top executive turnover, prior share price 
performance, and corporate control threats. Cotter et al. (1997) studied the role of 
independent outside directors during takeover attempts by tender offer. They found 
that independent outside directors enhance target shareholder’s gains from tender 
offers and a majority of independent directors are more likely to use resistance 
strategies to enhance shareholders’ wealth. 
 
In the view of Pearce and Zahra (1992) and Dalton et al. (1999) argue that as board 
size increase, the strategic decision making capabilities of the board increase and but 
Golden and Zajac (2001) argued that smaller boards are assumed to have inadequate 
confidence and unclear understanding in making strategic changes. If the board size 
increases the cost associated with it, like coordination cost and communication costs, 
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also increase (Rahej, 2005). Yermack (1996) empirically demonstrated that there is a 
negative relationship between board size and firm performance.  
 
It is also suggested that measures of operating efficiency and profitability are 
negatively related to the board size (Yermack, 1996). Eisenberg et al. (1998), in their 
study on small firms, also found this negative relation between firm performance and 
board size. Van Ees et al. (2003) performed a similar study on the listed firms in 
Netherlands and found that, even though the system of control mechanism is 
different in Netherlands than in their US counterparts, there is a negative relation 
between board size and firm performances in Netherlands, similar to the US. 
 
2.4.2 Empirical Literature Review in Africa 
Certain measures of board independence (such as board composition and board 
meeting,) had significant positive while others show negative effect on firm 
performance on the three banks listed at the DSE. It is obvious that there is relatively 
mixed results regarding corporate governance and various performance measures 
among listed firms in Ghana. However, for efficient performance of firms, the 
adoption of the two-tier board composition and maintaining smaller board sizes that 
hovers around eight members is critical. Coleman and Biekpe (2008). 
 
Aduda and Musyoka (2011) while looking at corporate governance mechanisms 
among commercial banks in Kenya found a negative relationship between executive 
compensation and bank size and this has been attributed to the diminishing influence 
of key owners as the bank grows in size. Performance ratios and opportunity only 
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appear to be inversely related to big banks, as their executives appear to subordinate 
their immediate financial interests to that of the overall goal of the firm, which is to 
maximize profitability.  
 
Micco et al. (2004) examine the relationship between bank ownership and bank 
performance for banks in 119 countries. They find that in developing countries, state 
owned banks have lower profitability, higher costs, higher employment ratios, and 
poorer asset quality than their domestic counterparts.  
 
Cornett, Guo, Khaksari, and Tehranian (2003) examine the differences in 
performance between state-owned and private banks in 16 Far East countries 
between 1989 and 1998.  
 
A number of empirical studies on non - executive directors support the beneficial 
monitoring and advisory functions to firm shareholders (see Brickley & James 
(1987); Weisbach 1988; Byrd & Hickman (1992); Brickley et al. (1994). Baysinger 
& Butler (1985) and Rosenstein & Wyatt (1990) showed that the market rewards 
firms for appointing non - executive directors. Brickley et al (1994) found a positive 
relation between proportion of non - executive directors and stock-market reactions 
to poison pill adoptions. Also Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2005) found a 
positive relationship between proportion of non - executive board members and 
performance of MFIs in Ghana. However, Forsberg (1989) found no relation 
between the proportion of non - executive directors and various performance 
measures. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2002) found no 
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significant relationship between board composition and performance. Yemack (1996) 
also showed that, the percentage of non - executive directors does not significantly 
affect firm performance.  
 
2.4.3 Empirical Literature Review in Tanzania 
There is a no pure linear positive or negative relationship between board composition 
and bank performance on these three banks listed at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock 
Exchange. Therefore, effective monitoring mechanisms that aim to foster 
competition may also yield performance improvements. (Swai and Mbogela, 2014). 
Okiro et all (2015) shows that there is a positive significant intervening effect of 
capital structure (leverage) on the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. From a theoretical perspective, corporate governance not only 
affects firm performance, but also uncovers the importance of capital structure in a 
corporate governance system. 
 
The Microfinance Institution’s board members are largely aware of their role, a few 
are either not aware or assertive enough, and this impacts the extent of their 
influence. Contrary to expectations, less educated, female, and local directors bring 
about superior financial and social performance of Microfinance Institutions. (Mori 
and Olomi, 2012). 
 
Based on the review of literature (theoretical and empirical review), this study can 
confirm the following observations;  
i) Some of the independent variables have shown positively related with 
profitability while others shown negatively related. 
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ii) In other case some independent variables are positively related while others 
negatively related with efficiency 
iii) The results from capital adequacy show that some of the independent 
variables show positive related while others show negative related.  
 
2.5 Policy Review  
In Tanzania, a poor performance of the state-owned financial sector in late 1980s 
forced the government to search for new policy directions in 1990, a special 
presidential commission recommended: (i) increasing competition by encouraging 
entry of foreign banks; (ii) strengthening the existing financial institutions; and (iii) 
developing management accountability. Based on these, the government has issued a 
policy statement on financial sector reform with the aim of creating a market-based 
financial system, efficient in mobilizing and allocating resources and supporting 
long-term economic growth. (Mwega, 1992). 
 
Until 1991 financial institutions and banks in Tanzania had been nationalized 
through the Arusha declaration, and the financial and economic system was fully 
controlled and owned by the State. In that financial system there were three 
commercial banks, two insurance companies, five development finance institutions 
(DFIs), two contractual savings institutions, one hired Purchase Company and the 
central bank.  
 
In 1991, the Bank of Tanzania introduced some new guidelines to improve the 
management structure and financial growth and also to stop further mismanagement 
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in the financial sector. Through these guidelines the Bank initiated the licensing of 
banks and formed a prudential framework for asset management, accrual of interest 
and provision for losses. The eligibility to get a license (i.e. the minimum capital 
requirement) was increased and the demonstration of the ability to operate profitably, 
efficiently and prudentially was made mandatory for the applicants. To supervise the 
whole financial system of the country, BOT also strengthened its Supervision 
Directorate. Tanzanian government witnessed some advantageous effects by 
implementing financial reform; they included an establishment of new financial 
institutions and the formation of two banks by 1994.  
 
A new regulatory framework has been introduced, organizational and financial 
restructuring of the two largest (formerly state owned) banks, the National Bank of 
Commerce (NBC) and the Cooperative and Rural Development Bank, has been 
implemented, and the sector has been opened to the entry of other financial services 
providers. The new Banking and Financial Institutions Act approved in the second 
half of 1991 allowed licensing of new banks, including subsidiaries of foreign banks. 
The first major foreign bank (Standard Chartered) started operations in 1992, with 
other international banks following. As at 31 December 2009 there were 40 financial 
institutions (including non-banking institutions). 
 
2.6 Research Gap 
Various studies have been done in context of developed economies however study 
regarding corporate governance and bank efficiency is very rare in context of 
developing countries. Dwivedi and Jain (2005), in their study on board size and firm 
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value, suggested a positive relationship. On the other hand, there are studies which 
point to a negative relationship between board size and firm performance in Indian 
context. Ghosh (2006) study on the relationship between financial performance and 
board parameters which include board size found that larger board size tends to have 
a negative influence on firm performance.  
 
I in turn conducted a study that will be equally interesting from the finance and 
corporate governance points of view. I agreed with many other researchers that the 
health of a company depends not only on ex-post information (financial statements) 
but also on ex-ante information, where board compositions are considered to be the 
one. Since majority of previous research studies were mostly done in the developed 
countries and some other in very selective developing countries, I have decided to 
analyze the three banks listed in Tanzania markets. 
 
Some research studies reveal that large board size leads to improved firm 
performance, whereas there have also been evidence of larger boards being 
inefficient in nature. So, this paper tried to bridge the gaps in the research 
relationship between corporate governance mechanism and bank performance in 
Tanzania of selected banks (i.e CRDB, NMB and DCB) listed at the Dar – es – 
Salaam Stock exchange. 
 
Experiences from developing countries have shown that bank’s performance may 
vary across nations or between banks (Neely, 1997). Banking industry in Tanzania is 
open to entry and therefore it is highly contestable. What is still cloaked is the extent 
20 
to which board composition affects banks’ performance in Tanzania. This paper 
examines the effect of board composition on banks’ performance in the three banks 
listed at the Dar-es-Salaam Stock Exchange. 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Frameworks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author Construction (2016) 
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2.7 Theoretical Frameworks 
The performance of banks can be judged from several angles and previous 
performance studies, such as Martin and Parker (1997) and Coelli (2002), have 
suggested that results can be sensitive to particular performance measures. Therefore, 
in this study I have considered profitability, efficiency and Capital adequacy as a 
combination of three dependent variables for performance measures. Profitability 
measures that have been used are Return on Assets (ROA), Gross Profit Margin 
(GPM), Net Profit Margin (NPM) and Return on Equity (ROE) and Efficiency 
measures are the Net Interest Margin (NIM) and Operating Efficiency Ratio (OER) 
because they capture different aspects of performance. However, the Equity to 
Deposits Liability (E/Li) and Liquid assets to Deposits Liability (LA/Li) had been 
used to capture for financial soundness of the banks (Capital Adequacy). These 
measures had also been used in earlier studies of bank ownership and performance 
Sarkar et al. (1998); De (2003) and Davies and Brucato (1987).  
 
Other independent variables which could influence the performance of the banks 
were also included. These are Board size, Bank age, Board meetings and 
combination of Board members (Executive and Non – Executive Directors). The 
banks established for longer period might have enjoyed advantages, such as learning 
effect and a broader client base, over relative new banks. Larger banks with many 
branches might have also enjoyed the economics of scale or scope economies that 
have positive effects on their performance. 
 
This  part  discusses  the  relevant theories that address the research objectives above.  
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There are several theories that can be used to study boards and governance, 
depending on the research objectives. For the purpose of my study and research 
objectives, I have chosen to employ the agency theory and resource dependence 
theory. I further argue that these theories suit this study since the literature review 
suggests that board roles broadly consist of monitoring (grounded in the agency 
theory) and advising (grounded in the resource dependence theory) (Dorado & Molz 
2005). 
 
2.7.1 Agency Theory 
The early research start with the discussion of agency theory problems that arise 
between different agents involved in the company. In the classical agency theory that 
started from Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) a firm is viewed as a set of 
contracts between different agents, who have self-interests and at the same time 
depend on each other in order to perform better and survive in the market. Jensen & 
Meckling say that relationships between stockholders and managers are perfectly 
fitting agency theory representing different agents with self-interests and therefore 
associated with the “separation of ownership and control”, which is extensively 
discussed in work by Fama & Jensen (1983) , Jensen & Meckling, (1976), p. 1975). 
 
The agency theory assumes that owners of an organization (principals) and those that 
manage the organization (agents) have different interests. Hence owners will face the 
problem that managers are likely to act according to their own interests rather than 
the owners’ interests (Fama & Jensen 1983). In this regard, boards are required to 
monitor managers on behalf of the owners. In performing this role, members are 
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expected to be independent and monitor the actions of managers as agents of the 
owners to ensure they are acting in accordance with the owners’ interests (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). The theory suggests that board composition is important for 
effectively monitoring top management (Hussein & Kiwia 2009). Boards have to be 
diverse in terms of skills, experience, and gender balance. This creates a balance on 
boards and leads to effective monitoring and subsequently to the successful 
performance of the organization. 
 
Agency theory provides the theoretical underpinning upon which the literature on 
corporate governance has flourished. The theory states that in the presence of 
information asymmetry the agent is likely to pursue interests that may hurt the 
principal, or shareholder (Ross, 1973); Fama, (1980). Within the context of the 
stakeholder theory, the problem of agency has been widened to allow for multiple 
principals. Thus, instead of treating shareholders as the sole group whose interest the 
agent should protect, the stakeholder theory sees other groups such as employees of 
the firm, creditors, government etc. also as having equally vital stakes in the 
performance of the firm, a fact amply demonstrated by the thousands of job losses, 
reduced tax revenues, high costs of litigation etc that came in the wake of such high-
profile corporate frauds as occurred at Enron, Global Crossing, Parmalat and 
Worldcom. Since there are many stakeholders, the agent is sometimes confronted 
with the difficult choice of meeting competing stakeholder interests.  
 
Agency theory suggests that corporate boards that meet more frequently and are 
more representative have increased capacity to effectively advise, monitor and 
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discipline management, and thereby improving corporate financial performance 
(Ntim & Osei, 2011). An important measure of corporate boards’ monitoring power 
and effectiveness is the frequency of board meetings (Jensen, 1993). This study 
found a statistically positive association between the frequency of corporate board 
and committee meetings and corporate performance. Generally the study observed 
that there is little evidence to suggest that, there is pure linear positive or negative 
relationship between board composition and financial performance. 
 
2.7.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
The board members are required to provide organizations with resources (Hillman & 
Dalziel 2003). The provision of resources is linked to the resource dependence 
theory. This theory holds that organizations are interdependent (Pfeffer & Salancik 
1978) in that they depend on each other and various actors for their survival as well 
as for resources. As a result, they need to find different ways of managing this 
dependence and ensuring they get the resources and information they need.  
 
From this perspective, the board is seen as one means of reducing uncertainty by 
creating influential links (Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Peng 2004). Board members 
provide organizations with various resources through board members’ skills, 
experience, and expertise. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) also note that ‘when an 
organization appoints an individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to 
support the organization, will concern himself with its problems, will invariably 
present it to others, and will try to aid it’.  
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Diversity in the composition of boards is important if boards are to effectively 
provide advice and resources. Board members with different skills and experience 
and of both genders contribute to effective resource provision and to the beneficial 
performance of organizations. In summary, both theories advocate that boards should 
have a diversity of competent members who are able to effectively monitor top 
managers and provide organizations with the resources they need. By performing 
these roles, board members are able to positively influence the performance of 
organizations. Although this study finds little evidence to suggest that, there is pure 
linear positive or negative relationship between board compositions with effect to 
financial performance on the three banks listed at the DSE but I believe that board 
members with different skills, experience, good compositions and a highly 
representative bring highly performance. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Overview 
This part focused on the research design used and why it is preferred, area of the 
research, sampling design and procedures, variables and measurement procedures, 
methods of data collection, data processing and analysis. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
This study used a deductive approach, where the researcher goes through the 
information, which is known about a certain area or found from the previous studies, 
and derives an analysis which then is tested through the empirical scrutiny. 
The research is a case study of analysis of board composition and financial 
performance of three selected banks listed at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock Exchange. 
The approach enabled the research to come up with an in-depth account of not only 
the analysis of board composition with related to firm financial performance, but also 
tried to give awareness to the shareholders the good composition of non – executive 
directors with those of executive directors. 
  
3.3 Area of the Study 
The study conducted on three selected banks (i.e CRDB, DCB, NMB) listed at the 
Dar – es – Salaam Stock Exchange. The reasons for the selections are as follows; 
first, these are only banks listed at the DSE more than five years and secondly, the 
control system of banks is different from other corporate because if a bank fails, the 
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impact can spread rapidly through to other banks with potentially serious 
consequences for the entire financial system and the macro economy. 
 
3.3.1 CRDB Bank Plc  
CRDB Bank Plc (“CRDB Bank” or the “Bank”) and its subsidiaries (together, “the 
Group”) provide corporate and retail banking services including microfinance 
services in Tanzania as well as Burundi. The Bank is a public limited company 
incorporated under the Companies Act 2002 and domiciled in Tanzania. The Bank 
and its subsidiaries-CRDB Microfinance Services Company Limited (MFSC) 
operate in Tanzania; and CRDB Bank Burundi S.A. operates from Bujumbura in 
Burundi. The Bank’s principal activity is the provision of banking and related 
financial services. The Group’s other major subsidiary provides microfinance 
services through the Bank’s branch network.  
 
The Group offers a comprehensive range of Corporate, Retail, Treasury, Premier, 
and wholesale banking and microfinance services through a network of 103 static 
and mobile branches, 311 ATMs including 18 Depository ATMs, 1,162 Point of 
Sales (POS) terminals, 491 Agents (fahari Huduma) and 441 Microfinance partners’ 
institutions. 
 
3.3.2 DCB Bank Plc 
Dar es Salaam Community Bank Limited (DCB) is a private microfinance bank 
dedicated to financing poverty alleviation programmes, aimed at uplifting the 
standard of living of the majority of low income people in Dar es Salaam. It was 
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registered in 2001 and incorporated in Tanzania under the Companies Ordinance, 
and licensed by the Bank of Tanzania under the Banking and Financial Institutions 
Act, 1991, as a regional unit commercial bank. Dar es Salaam Community bank 
commenced operations to the public on 15th April 2002.  
In 2008, DCB became the first bank in Tanzania to be listed to Dar es Salaam Stock 
Exchange (DSE). In February 2012, the Bank changed its name from Dar es Salaam 
Community Bank Plc to DCB Commercial Bank Plc and in July 2012, the bank was 
issued with a license to carry out banking business country wide as a fully-fledged 
Commercial Bank. 
 
Each DCB branch is installed with onsite shared ATM of Umoja Switch. We offer 
ATM services through Umoja Switch. There are more than 120 ATMs across the 
Country shared by 24 banks in Tanzania which are DCB Commercial Bank Plc, 
Akiba Commercial Bank, Azania Bank, BOA Bank, Twiga Bank, Tanzania 
Investment Bank, Uchumi Commercial Bank, Access Bank Tanzania Ltd and 
Commercial Bank of Africa. Others are Tanzania Women Bank, Mkombozi 
Commercial bank, Peoples Bank of Zanzibar, Tanzania Postal Bank, Kilimanjaro 
Corporative Bank, Efatha Bank, NIC Bank, Njombe Community Bank, Mwanga 
Community Bank, Mufindi Community Bank, agera Farmers' Cooperative 
Bank, Mbinga Community Bank and Amana Bank. 
 
3.3.3 NMB Bank Plc 
NMB was established under the National Microfinance Bank Limited Incorporation 
Act of 1997, following the break-up of the old National Bank of Commerce, by an 
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Act of Parliament. Three new entities were created at the time, namely: (a) NBC 
Holdings Limited (b) National Bank of Commerce (1997) Limited and (c) National 
Microfinance Bank Limited.  
 
Initially NMB could only provide payment services as well as offer savings accounts, 
with limited lending capabilities, before becoming a fully-fledged universal retail 
bank. 
 
On the Distribution side, NMB branch network increase from 147 to 153 branches, 
of which 136 are in rural areas, and 17 are in Dar Es Salaam. Also NMB continues to 
expand its network of Business Centres, targeted at large corporate, SME’s and 
Government. These are located in Arusha city, Mwanza city and Dar es Salaam. 
Currently, NMB operates 600 ATMs and has entered into cooperation with 
Vodacom, a Mobile Network Operator (MNO), and allowing NMB Mobile 
customers to transact directly to and from their M-Pesa mobile payment platform. 
This effectively expanded the bank’s physical distribution with another 40,000 
additional cash-in/cash-out points operated by M-Pesa agents. 
 
3.4 Population of the Study 
The target population for this study comprised all the fourteen (14) companies listed 
at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock Exchange. Due to time factors I will do the analysis 
for only three banks which have more than five years and have full financial 
statements from the year 2009 to 2014. 
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Table 3.1: The list of the Listed Companies at the DSE Is as Shown Below 
S/No. Company Date Listed Nature of Business 
1. TOL Gases Ltd 
15th April, 
1998 
Production and distribution of 
industrial gases, welding 
equipments, medical gases, etc. 
 
 
2. 
Tanzania 
Breweries Ltd 
9thSeptember,1
998 
Production, marketing and 
distribution of malt beer in Tanzania 
  
 
3. 
Tatepa Company 
Ltd 
17th December, 
1999 
Growing, processing, blending, 
marketing and distribution of tea and 
instant. 
 
 
4. 
Tanzania 
Cigarette Co. 
Ltd 
16th November, 
2000 
Manufacturing, marketing, 
distribution and sale of cigarettes.  
5. 
Tanga Cement 
Public Co. Ltd  
26th September, 
2002 
 Production, sale and marketing of 
cement.  
6. 
Swissport 
Tanzania Ltd 
26th September, 
2006 
Airports handling of passengers and 
cargo. 
  
 
7. 
Tanzania 
Portland Cement 
Company Ltd 
29th September, 
2008 
Production, sale and marketing of 
cement. 
 
 
8. 
Dar – es – 
Salaam 
Community 
Bank 
16th September, 
2008 
Commercial bank  
9. 
National 
Microfinance 
Bank 
6th November, 
2008 
Commercial bank 
10. CRDB Bank 17th June, 2009 Commercial bank 
11. 
Precision Air 
Services Plc 
21st December, 
2011 
 Air transport services  
12. 
Maendeleo Bank 
Plc 
4th November, 
2013 
Commercial bank 
 
 
13. 
Swala Gas and 
Oil 
11th August, 
2014 
Mineral Exploration 
 
 
14. 
Mkombozi 
Commercial 
Bank 
29th December, 
2014 
Commercial bank 
 
Source: DSE Website (2016) 
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3.5 Sampling Design and Procedures 
3.5.1 Research Design 
This research used a case study designed using both the quantitative and qualitative 
(descriptive) research methods. Quantitative design used in order to get the output of 
the financial performance while qualitative design used to analyze the board 
compositions in terms of executive and non – executive directors.   
 
The study conducted through the use of case study designed to focus on a single area 
(area of study) and various types of data collected were used. Moreover, case study 
designed gave room for research to analyze the particular unit in detail with its 
findings being unique from the rest, excels at bringing me to an understanding of a 
complex issue or object which extended experience or added strength to what is 
already known through previous research. 
 
3.5.2 Procedures 
In order to undergo the research, I got a letter of clearance from The Open University 
of Tanzania which allowed me to collect data from the three banks listed at the Dar – 
es – Salaam Stock Exchange aiming to introduce me to the Dar –es – Salaam 
Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS) so as to request the authority by whom 
will allow me to collecting Data of their firms. 
 
3.5.3 Sampling Unit  
According to Mugenda M. and Mugenda G. (1999) Sampling is the process of 
selecting a number of individuals for a study in such a way that the individuals 
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selected represent the large group from which they were selected. With this aspect 
sampling should be in respect of representative of the whole population with relevant 
characteristics. 
 
3.5.4 Sample Size 
According to Kothari (2007) sample is a collection of some parts of the population to 
be a true representative of the population. Sample size refers to a number of items to 
be selected from the population. 
 
The target population for this study conducted based on the sample of three publicly 
banks among all fourteen (14) companies listed at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock 
Exchange (DSE). First of all, due to this study I have listed all fourteen (14) 
companies, the dates of listed and the nature of business and secondly, I chose only 
banks which have published their annual reports not less than five years from the 
date of listing. According to the list of companies listed at the DSE the banks which 
are listed and published their annual reports not less than five are Dar – es – Salaam 
Community Bank which was listed on 16th September, 2008, National Microfinance 
Bank listed on 6th November, 2008 and CRDB Bank listed on 17th June, 2009.   
 
3.5.5 Sampling Methods 
Sampling method or technique defined as a process of selecting a number of 
individual or objects from a population such that the selected group contains 
elements representative of characteristics found in entire group (Kothari, 2007). 
There are two types of sampling, namely Probability and Non-probability sampling. 
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In probability sampling, there is equal opportunity for all the elements to be selected, 
while in non-probability sampling, no equal chance for the element to be        
selected. 
 
This study used non – probability sampling particularly Purposive Sampling. In this 
case the study used extreme case sampling. Kombo and Tromp (2006:83), defines 
extreme case sampling as type of purposive sampling which focuses on the cases that 
are rich in information because they are special in some way.  
 
3.5.6 Variables and Measurement Procedures  
There are two categories of variables for this study, independent variable and 
dependent variables. The independent variable measures board composition where 
others dependent variables measure financial performance: ROA, ROE, NPM, GPM, 
NIM, OER, E/Li and LA/Li.  
 
The variables which used in this study are board size, numbers of executive and non 
– executive directors, number of meetings (for board composition) as independent 
variables while return on asset, net profit margin, gross profit margin, return on 
equity, net interest margin, operating efficiency ratio, equity to deposits liability and 
liquid assets to deposits liability as dependent variables. 
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Table 3.2: Description of Variables and Their Measurement  
Variables Measurement 
A: Profitability  
1. Return on Asset 
(ROA) 
ROA is measured as the ratio of net profit to total assets during a 
financial year, to show the return on bank’s assets. 
2. Net profit margin 
(NPM) 
NPM is measured as the ratio of profit after tax and interest to 
total income during the financial year, to show the return of net 
profit on bank’s income.  
3. Return on equity 
(ROE) 
ROE is measured as the ratio of net profit to shareholders funds 
(Ordinary share plus reserves). To show the return to 
shareholders on the bank’s earnings. 
4.Gross profit margin 
(GPM) 
GPM is measured as the ratio of gross profit to total income 
during a financial year, to show the return on bank’s income. 
B: Efficiency  
1. Operational efficiency 
    Ratio (OER) (%) 
OER is measured as a ratio of Non interest expenses + Interest 
expense/ loan & Advances + probable losses. To determine how 
efficiency the bank has been in making loans. The lower the % 
the more the efficient the bank is. 
2. Net Interest Margin 
    (NIM) 
 
NIM is measured as the difference between interest earned and 
interest expended to average total assets. NIM measures the 
efficiency of portfolio management of banks. The higher the % 
the better. 
C: Capital adequacy  
1. Liquid assets to 
Customer deposit 
Liabilities (LA/Li) (%) 
LA/Li is measured as the Liquid assets / customer deposits. To 
show how many liquid assets the bank has to cover Customer 
Deposits i.e. represents a financial variable (liquidity) that 
enables the assessment of the banks’ capability to allocate the 
borrowed resources. 
2. Equity capital to 
Deposit 
    Liabilities (E/Li) (%) 
Total shareholders’ funds to total deposits. Shows the extent to 
which total capital covers the bank’s deposit liability. 
D: Board Composition  
1. Executive Director 
This is a member of the board of directors of a company who is 
also an employee (usually full time) of that company and who 
often has a specified are of responsibility. 
2. Non – Executive 
     Directors 
This is member of the board of directors of company who does 
not form part of the executive team.  
3. Board Size 
This is the total number of board members which form a board 
of Directors 
4. Board Meetings These are the number of board meetings during the year. 
5. Committee Meetings These are the number of committee meetings during the year. 
6. Bank Age This is the number of years since the bank started business. 
Source: Authors (2016) 
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3.5.7 The Model 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model is used to analyze the relationship 
between mechanism of the corporate governance and performance variables. The 
model estimated in this study assumes that the bank performance depends on several 
corporate governance and control variables. The corporate governance variables 
considered are executive directors, non – executive directors, board meetings, 
committee meetings and bank age. The dependent variables considered are return on 
assets, return on equity, net profit margin, gross profit margin, net interest margin, 
and operational efficiency ratio, equity to deposits liability and liquid assets to 
deposits liability.  
 
The multiple regression equation shown below has several slope estimates 
(regression coefficients). When the independent variables are correlated with each 
other, one of the slope estimates might be influenced by other slope estimates. In this 
case, the correlation analysis is needed in order to define whether the regression 
coefficients are reliable. But before that I considered it was important to go through 
the practical issues, which happened during the analysis.  
 
Therefore the model took the following form: 
Bank performance = f (corporate governance variables, control variables)  
More specifically,  
Bank performance = β0 + β1X1+β2X2+ β3X3+β4X4+ ε, which can simplified more 
as; 
Y = β0 + β1X1+β2X2+ β3X3+β4X4+ ε  
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Where, 
Y = a measure of performance (ROA, ROE, NPM, GPM, NIM, OER, E/Li and 
LA/Li) 
β0 = the intercept term 
β1 = Coefficient of board size 
β2 = coefficient of number of executive directors 
β3 = coefficient of number of non – executive directors 
β4 = coefficient of board meetings 
X1 = board size 
X2 = number of executive directors 
X3 = number of non – executive directors 
X4 = number of board meetings 
 ε = error term 
 
‘’The goal of the regression is to arrive at the set β values, called regression 
coefficients that bring the Y values predicted from the equations as close as possible 
to the Y values obtained by the measurement’’ (Tabachnick & Fidel, 2007, p. 118). 
 
3.6 Data Collection 
The data collection of this study will be done through annual reports, which are 
considered as objective, because they are developed and published based on certain 
regulations that companies must follow (IFRS : IAS 1). The way they are presented 
and designed might be different in other areas, but general rules and regulations they 
follow are similar. Popper (cited in Coldwell, 2007, p. 3) suggests that there is a 
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possibility to use subjective thoughts as objective ideas that exist independent from 
the individuals who initially spoke or wrote about them. Even though there is 
possibility that annual reports, which are written by managers, who can 
unconsciously add their subjective thoughts or judgements concerning a company’s 
performance, one could still consider annual reports as a product of objective 
decisions, since not only a manager who is responsible for a company’s financial 
statement. 
 
In this study, the collection of financial information with the help of annual reports is 
necessary. I believe that annual reports as a secondary information source are 
objective and trustable, therefore I will not be biased and I have no intention to 
present misleading results. Based on that, I argue that my research is objective. 
 
3.6.1 Data Collection Methods 
The study used secondary data which were obtained from a review of audited 
financial statements. Through audited financial statements I managed to calculate the 
Return on Assets (ROA), net profit margin (NPM), return on equity (ROE), gross 
profit margin (GPM), net interest margin (NIM), operating efficiency ratio (OER), 
equity to deposits liability (E/Li) and liability assets to deposits liability (LA/Li) as 
independent variables. However, apart from that I managed to collect data for the 
combination of Board members (Executive and Non – Executive Director), board 
size, bank age and board meeting.  
 
The periods of the study were 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. This period is 
significant because it signifies when at least every bank was about one year after first 
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listed (i.e DCB bank was first listed on 16th September, 2008, NMB bank on 6th 
November, 2008 and CRDB bank on 17th June, 2009) at the DSE.   
 
3.6.2 Data Collection Tools 
The data for this study were extracted from the audited financial statements and other 
annual reports from DSE, banks websites and other different sources. I used 
secondary panel data from the three banks sourced from the audited annual reports. 
The study period is from 2010 to 2014. 
 
During the pilot study, I also collected brochures, leaflets, journals, books, research 
articles, magazines, board policies, board TORs, and other relevant information from 
the offices of the three banks visited, as well as from websites such as 
www.emaraldinsight.com, www.jstor.org, www.4shared.com , www.oro.open.ac.uk 
and www.scholar.google.com, http://crdbbank.com, http://www.nmb.com, 
htt://www.dse.co.tz and http://www.dcb.co.tz. Some of which had a clear description 
of their mission, vision, target groups, and in some cases even board composition. 
The secondary information proved useful for asking focused or follow-up questions. 
Data analysis continued during and after data collection and focused on identifying 
patterns, differences, similarities, and apparent links in the data. A system of 
categories for collecting and sorting data greatly facilitates identifying scripts. 
Although the types of categories used depend on the research project, experienced 
field researchers typically employ several broad categorization schemes for 
collecting observational data. Furthermore, I clustered information that addressed 
primary questions such as what, why, who, how, and when (Lofland 1976). This 
39 
clustering allowed me to identify emergent themes in the data without introducing 
premature analytical bias. 
 
3.6.3 Reliability and Validity of Data 
The study used the reliable and valid data from yearly audited financial statements 
for five years from 2010 to 2014 of the three banks listed at the Dar – es – Salaam 
Stock Exchange. 
 
Reliability is concerned whether the techniques and methods used in a research 
would produce similar results if this research was repeated in another occasion or by 
another researcher. It is not so easy to ensure the reliability of the research, thus it is 
important to remember and avoid some threats, which we are going to mention. One 
of them is researcher error, which might happen if some of the factors like a 
researcher’s mood might influence his interpretation. Another important threat that 
might take place is researcher’s bias, which implies that a researcher may allow 
being very subjective. (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 192). 
 
Reliability according to Bryman, concerns with the issues of consistency of measures 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 168). Moreover, Bryman states that reliability has three factors 
that make a study reliable. The first factor is stability, which looks at the measures as 
stable over time. In other words, the measures used in a study should lead to the 
same results and do not fluctuate over time (Bryman, 2012, p. 169). For our study, 
we believe those measures we used can be reliable. We have only taken one-year 
financial information of companies, representing the financial results for the year 
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2012. We are sure that taking the same financial year data, another researcher will 
end up with the same results. Our measures are also stable, since they are unchanged 
financial results for the past 2012 year. Another factor that Bryman mentions is 
internal reliability. This factor is applicable for multiple-indicator measures, which 
should be related between each other (Bryman, 2012, p. 170). For our study, this 
factor is not applicable; our data collection has not been done with the help of 
multiple questions. The last factor of reliability is inter-observer consistency. It is 
relevant when a research has been conducted by more than one researcher, in this 
case subjectivity can give a rise.  
 
For my study, I have followed the same steps in collecting and analysing the data. 
The segmentation of companies is done according to Altman’s categorization. The 
information about the board has been collected from annual reports and the numbers 
presented are objective. The statistical analyses have been conducted accordingly and 
interpreted with high level of objectivity. 
 
Validity is concerned with how accurate the measure represents a concept (Zikmund 
et al., 2013, p.304). Validity according to Bryman refers to issue whether an 
indicator used can really be used in order to measure the concept (Bryman, 2012, p. 
171). There are internal and external validity. Internal validity mostly relates to 
causality, where there is a causal relationship between variables (Bryman, 2012, p. 
47). Simply, can my selected independent variables of the board composition 
structure be used in explaining the financial performance? I have based my decision 
on numerous previous research studies, where the board compositions have already 
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been tested and showed the connection with financial performance conditions. Thus, 
I can be sure that my measures can in fact be used to measure the financial 
performance.  
 
External validity is concerned with the question whether the same results can be 
applied to the population, based on the samples (Bryman, 2012, p.47). I in my study 
have selected three banks listed not less than five years at the DSE. I believe that 
even though some of the companies were eliminated from the study due to time 
factors, the same results would be obtained if they could be included in the study. 
Measurement validity is concerned with the question whether a measure used in 
defining the concept does really reflect that concept (Bryman, 2012, p. 47). For my 
study, dependent variable is expressed by regression model, which was proved to 
indicate the financial conditions of banks and be a recognized prediction model for 
financial performance. The rest independent variables were expressed either in real 
numbers or percentage ratios. The same measurements were used in previous 
research studies, which make me sure that my measurements are reliable. 
 
3.6.4 Data Processing and Analysis 
Two methods of data analysis were employed and the results were therefore divided 
into two to reflect this categorization. The first type of analysis was descriptive 
analysis, which provides some percentages, mean, trends and averages of  board size, 
numbers of executive and non – executive directors, number of board meetings (for 
board composition structure) as independent variables. The second type of analysis 
was regression especially fixed effects approach which was used to measure the 
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return on asset, net profit margin, gross profit margin, return on equity, net interest 
margin, operating efficiency ratio, equity to deposits liability and liquid assets to 
deposits liability as dependent variables. Presentations of the results were in a form 
of table and charts. Finally, the conclusion and recommendations are based on the 
findings of the research.     
 
3.7 Ethical Consideration 
Ethical refers to the standards of behavior that guide researchers' conduct in relation 
to the rights of those who become the subject of research, or are affected by it 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012).   
 
When conducting research studies it is not only important to take into consideration 
all the required steps when doing certain studies, but it is also very vital to be aware 
of ethical issues. Ethics by itself is a very broad concept, but if we look at it from the 
research perspective it might be defined as a code or a set of rules how researchers 
supposed to behave when conducting a research (Wells, 1994, p. 284). In addition, 
social norms of behaviour are affecting researchers’ actions. Social norms are the 
type of behaviour that a researcher needs to adopt in a particular situation (Saunders, 
2000, p.131). Hence, it is important to consider ethical issues during the research 
conduction and be aware of how this study might influence the ones whom the 
researcher is approaching and those, who might be affected by this research. 
 
The nature of business research refers that in most of the cases a researcher will be 
involved in the data collection where individuals from the real world will take part 
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through interviews, observations or surveys. For example, a researcher who is 
conducting his studies in a certain organization should be sensitive to the fact that his 
presence is temporal and his studies will not lead to unpleasant consequences in the 
environment of employees who participated in this research (Saunders, 2000, p. 131). 
 
According to Lindorf (2007), p. 22, there are three ethical principles, which are 
important to take into consideration when conducting research. The first one is 
justice which requires that the “benefits and burdens” of the studies should be 
equally distributed among groups. It happens in the situations where employees 
might be forced to participate in the research due to their belonging to a certain 
company. In addition, because they are working in a certain company or an area they 
should not be contacted at inappropriate times or forced to disclose any information. 
Since I collected data from the downloaded audited annual reports that I find in 
companies’ home pages, I believe that in my case the justice is present. The 
information used in my study is secondary and truthful.  
 
The main goals of the research conducted are different from different perspectives. 
For example, researchers conduct studies in a company due to their desire to define 
new knowledge, whereas shareholders are seeking for new ways for increasing their 
welfare. Thus interests of society are usually complex and dependent on different 
dimensions. The consequence of those interests might be because of complexity to 
provide fair and transparent information. There might be a situation where the 
organization which sponsored the research will not be happy if researchers will 
publish any negative issues related to this company (Lindorf, 2007, p. 23). 
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The second ethical principle is “beneficence”, which requires researchers to secure 
the well-being of participants through maximizing the benefits they provide with the 
research and minimizing the risks of harm during and after the research is conducted. 
For example, the qualitative research strategy involved in data collection can affect a 
life of participants even if they are recorded as anonymous (Lindorf, 2007, p. 24). 
Since I used the secondary information in my research paper which is open publicly, 
therefore I suppose that risks of making harm to a certain company by using its 
annual report in my research studies are close to zero. 
 
The third principle is respect of participants which is shown through considering 
them as “autonomous agents” and providing protection to them. Many researchers 
can consider that study, which benefits the organization as beneficial to society in 
general. Many explain it from the perspective of the shareholder theory, where the 
researchers are helping the shareholders in the enhancement of their welfare 
(Lindorf, 2007, p. 26). I suppose that my research from the social aspect will be 
beneficial to shareholders and investors when making a decision about investing to a 
certain company looking at its board composition in case there is a relationship 
between composition and financial performance. My research might influence the 
regulations and companies’ acts when it comes to board composition. The 
characteristics of the board under examination in this study might show influence on 
the financial performance, thus, some new regulations or reconsiderations can be 
made. As it was mentioned above, Lindolf (2007) stated that many researchers 
consider the contributions to the enhancement of shareholders’ welfare as an impact 
to society. My research is valuable to the investors and shareholders who are 
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outsiders and do not have enough information when considering the financial 
condition of a certain company. Thus I also consider that my research will make a 
contribution to society from perspective of shareholders and investors. 
 
Since I collected data through annual reports, I was very attentive to avoid 
misinterpretations of companies’ financial statements. I didn’t work face-to-face with 
companies’ board of directors or managers, thus ethical issues that might arise I tried 
to avoid by interpreting the information provided in a correct way without any 
misleading. Another example is when secondary data might be concerned with 
privacy. It might be due to the case when a researcher wants to get an access to the 
employees’ personal data, which has a high level of confidentiality. I also didn’t 
work with confidential information therefore I considered privacy issues were not 
significant in my research. Besides, that is the privilege of a company to choose 
which information they are considering as publicly available. Therefore, any secret 
information was not provided in annual reports. In addition, there is another 
important aspect to pay attention to the data collection stage, which is engaged with a 
number of ethical considerations like issues related to the method of data collection. 
One of the main principles when collecting data is to stay objective. In this context 
objective means that a researcher should collect data accurately and without 
involvement of any subjective decisions or judgements (Saunders et al., 2000, pp. 
134-135). 
 
In this study, the researcher ensured that there is confidentiality of the data provided 
by the banks.  In addition, researcher ensures anonymity of participant's identities. 
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Before collecting the data, banks were informed the purpose of the study and the way 
the results were used for. The study complied with standards, rules, regulations and 
ethical requirements on collecting data and reporting those data.  
 
3.8 Expected Research Findings  
The findings revealed the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance and confirm the significant intervening effect of board composition on 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 INTERPRETATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter provides data analysis and discuss the findings for the objectives in the 
first chapter. It starts by presenting data collected from the field, it proceeded by 
providing analysis of what was found in the field and finalise by providing 
discussion though making comparison with what other schoolars have found in their 
studies. 
 
4.2 Interpretation of Results 
4.2.1 Presentation of Collected Data   
4.2.1.1 Total Assets 
Table 4.1 below shows the increase of total assets for both banks, the total assets for 
NMB had been increased from Tshs. 2,107,081,000,000 equals to 14.79% in 2010 to 
Tshs. 3,881,995,000,000 which is equals to 27.25% in 2014, the same to CRDB bank 
which has been increased from Tshs. 2,304,573,278,000 equals to 14.62% in 2010 to 
Tshs. 4,124,729,000,000 equals to 26.17% in 2014 while the total assets for DCB 
bank have been increased from Tshs. 95,212,873,479 equals to 15.52% in 2010 to 
Tshs. 157,512,830,000 which is equals to 25.67% in 2014. This shows that the total 
assets of CRDB banks have increased more compared to NMB and DCB banks. The 
figure 4.1 below shows how the total assets for both banks have been increased from 
year 2010 to 2014. 
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Table 4.1: Total Assets 
BANKS YEARS (Tshs) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
NMB 2,107,081,000,000  2,170,250,000,000 2,800,747,000,000  3,287,175,000,000   3,881,995,000,000  14,247,248,000,000 
CRDB 2,304,573,278,000  2,713,124,000,000 3,074,816,000,000 3,545,220,000,000  4,124,729,000,000  15,762,462,278,000 
DCB      95,212,873,479  99,358,956,475    117,440,069,000   143,969,471,000     157,512,830,000  613,494,199,954 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Figure: 4.1: Total Assets 
 
Source : Banks Audited Financial Statements  
 
4.2.1.2 Net income 
Table 4.2 below shows the fluctuation of the net income for both banks, the net 
income of NMB have been increased from Tshs. 275,282,000,000 equals to 14.48% 
of the total net income of five years in 2010 to Tshs. 561,622,000,000 equals to 
29.54% in 2014, where the net income for CRDB bank has been increased from 
Tshs. 225,496,000,000 equals to 12.82% in 2010 to Tshs. 511,266,000,000 equals to 
29.06% in 2014 while the net income for DCB bank have been increased from Tshs. 
16,429,637,231 equals to 14.17% in 2010 to Tshs. 32,259,256,000 equals to 27.82% 
in 2014. This show that NMB banks leads to have net income increased to 30% 
compared to CRDB and DCB banks which their net income have been increased to 
29% and 28% respectively in year 2014 to total income for five years. The figure 4.2 
below shows how the histograms of net income for both banks from year 2010 to 
2014. 
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Table 4.2: Net Income  
BANKS YEARS (Tshs) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
NMB 275,282,000,000 212,614,000,000 382,513,000,000 468,989,000,000 561,622,000,000 1,901,020,000,000 
CRDB 225,496,000,000 246,612,000,000 356,001,000,000 419,976,000,000 511,266,000,000 1,759,351,000,000 
DCB 16,429,637,231 18,577,210,707 21,062,323,000 27,632,887,000 32,259,256,000 115,961,313,938 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Figure 4.2: Net Income 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
4.2.1.3 Gross Profit  
The gross profit for both NMB, CRDB and DCB banks on table 4.3 below have 
increased from Tshs. 92,734,000,000 ,Tshs. 119,429,000,000 and Tshs. 
12,341,052,557 equal to 9.54%, 11.96% and 16.85% respectively in 2010 to Tshs. 
287,881,000,000 ,Tshs. 300,286,000,000 and Tshs.18,102,830,000 equal to 29.61%, 
30.07% and 24.72% repectively in 2014. These results show that NMB and CRDB 
banks have experienced higher gross profit increase to 30% compared to DCB bank 
which gross profit has increased only to 25% in year 2014. This can be seen on 
figure 4.3 below which shows the graph of gross profit for both banks for the period. 
52 
 
 
Table 4.3: Gross Profit 
BANKS YEARS (Tshs) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
NMB 92,734,000,000 123,226,000,000 207,367,000,000 261,092,000,000 287,881,000,000 972,300,000,000 
CRDB 119,429,000,000 115,955,000,000 211,143,000,000 251,824,000,000 300,286,000,000 998,637,000,000 
DCB 12,341,052,557 12,924,440,756 12,440,477,000 17,412,669,000 18,102,830,000 73,221,469,313 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Figure 4.3: Gross Profit 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements  
 
4.2.1.4 Net Profit 
The table 4.4 below shows that the net profit of CRDB had been decreased from 
Tshs. 46,355,000,000 in 2010 equals to 20.56% of the net income to Tshs. 
36,322,000,000 in 2011 equals to 14.73% of the net income before being increased to 
Tshs.77, 806,000,000 equals to 21.86% of the net income in 2012 and Tshs. 
95,304,000,000 which was equal to 18.64% of the net income in 2014. The net profit 
for NMB bank had increased from Tshs. 53,981,000,000 in 2010 equals to 19.61% of 
the net income to Tshs. 155,623,000,000 equals to 27.71% of the net income for 
2014 while the net profit for DCB bank had been fluctuating from Tshs. 
3,166,457,462 equals to 19.27% of the net income in 2010 to Tshs. 3,776,624,000 
which was equal to 11.71% of the net income in 2014, these results can also be seen 
in figure 4.4 below. 
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Table 4.4: Net Profit  
BANKS YEARS (Tshs) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
NMB 53,981,000,000 71,839,000,000 97,322,000,000 133,638,000,000 155,623,000,000 512,403,000,000 
CRDB 46,355,000,000 36,322,000,000 77,806,000,000 83,607,000,000 95,304,000,000 339,394,000,000 
DCB 3,166,457,462 3,261,648,081 1,908,430,000 3,711,123,000 3,776,624,000 15,824,282,543 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Figure 4.4: Net Profit  
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
4.2.1.5 Equity (Ordinary Shares plus Reserves) 
The table 4.5 below shows the increase of equity of both NMB, CRDB and DCB 
banks from Tshs. 230,520,000,000, 140,933,000,000 and 14,818,210,979 in 2010 to 
Tshs. 567,221,000,000, Tshs. 434,236,000,000 and Tshs. 33,926,956,000 in 2014 
respectively. The results shows that the ordinary share plus reverse of  NBM bank 
has been increased from 12.16% in 2010 to 29.93% in 2014, where the CRDB bank 
has been increased from 9.65% in 2010 to 29.74% in 2014. On the other hand the 
ordinary share plus reserve of DCB bank has been increased from 12.20% in 2010 to 
27.93% in 2014 as it has shown on figure 4.5 below.  
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Table 4.5: Equity (Ordinary shares plus Reserve) 
BANKS YEARS (Tshs) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
NMB 230,520,000,000 284,359,000,000 356,310,000,000 456,666,000,000 567,221,000,000 1,895,076,000,000 
CRDB 140,933,000,000 201,501,000,000 312,958,000,000 370,284,000,000 434,236,000,000 1,459,912,000,000 
DCB 14,818,210,979 16,524,983,732 24,202,479,000 31,981,687,000 33,926,956,000 121,454,316,711 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Figure 4.5: Equity (Ordinary shares plus Reserve) 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements  
 
 
4.2.1.6 Net Interest 
The table 4.6 and figure 4.6 below show the increase in net interest of both NMB, 
CRDB and DCB banks from Tshs. 128,736,000,000, 100,817,000,000 and 
8,261,298,517, equals to 10.53%, 11.96% and 13.35% in 2010 to Tshs. 
361,750,000,000, Tshs. 237,673,000,000 and Tshs. 17,584,871,000 equals to 
29.59%, 28.20% and 28.42%  in 2014 respectively.   
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Table 4.6: Net Interest  
BANKS YEARS (Tshs) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
NMB 128,736,000,000 173,421,000,000 252,725,000,000 306,027,000,000 361,750,000,000 1,222,659,000,000 
CRDB 100,817,000,000 122,169,000,000 179,747,000,000 202,510,000,000 237,673,000,000 842,916,000,000 
DCB 8,261,298,517 10,901,081,279 10,710,999,000 14,412,516,000 17,584,871,000 61,870,765,796 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Figure 4.6: Net Interest 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
4.2.1.7 Operational Costs 
The table 4.7 below shows the increase of operational costs of all banks. The 
operational costs for NMB bank had been increased from Tshs. 134,169,000,000 
equals to 11.54% in 2010 to Tshs. 336,963,000,000 equals to 28.99% in 2014, where 
the operational costs for CRDB bank had been increased from Tshs. 162,406,000,000 
equals to 12.55% in 2010 to Tshs. 381,258,000,000 equals to 29.46% in 2014, while 
the DCB bank operational costs had been increased from Tshs. 12,186,382,913 
equals to 12.96%  in 2010 to Tshs. 27,036,373,000 equals to 28.76% in 2014. The 
figure 4.7 below shows the graph of operational costs for both banks from year 2010 
to 2014. 
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Table 4.7: Operational Costs 
BANKS YEARS (Tshs) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
NMB 134,169,000,000 172,496,000,000 237,772,000,000 280,957,000,000 336,963,000,000 1,162,357,000,000 
CRDB 162,406,000,000 197,737,000,000 252,093,000,000 300,694,000,000 381,258,000,000 1,294,188,000,000 
DCB 12,186,382,913 14,139,943,530 18,221,757,000 22,412,753,000 27,036,373,000 93,997,209,443 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
Figure 4.7: Operational Costs 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
4.2.1.8 Loans and Advances 
The loans and advances for both NMB, CRDB and DCB banks on the table 4.8 
below have increased from Tshs. 1,010,091,000,000 ,Tshs. 1,418,761,000,000 and 
Tshs. 65,034,477,646 in 2010 to Tshs. 2,148,297,000,000 ,Tshs. 2,784,056,000,000 
and Tshs.99,607,316,000 in 2014 repectively. These results show that CRDB bank 
has experienced higher loans and advances followed by NMB bank, where DCB 
bank experienced less amount paid as loans and advances as it can be seen on the 
figure 4.8 below. 
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Table 4.8: Loans and Advances 
BANKS YEARS (Tshs) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
NMB 1,010,091,000,000 1,296,255,000,000 1,548,994,000,000 1,767,669,000,000 2,148,297,000,000 7,771,306,000,000 
CRDB 1,418,761,000,000 1,639,964,000,000 1,820,556,000,000 2,304,098,000,000 2,784,056,000,000 9,967,435,000,000 
DCB 65,034,477,646 66,332,814,751 73,696,541,000 93,487,550,000 99,607,316,000 398,158,699,397 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Figure 4.8: Loans and Advances 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statement 
 
4.2.1.9 Customer Deposits Liability 
The results from table 4.9 and figure 4.9 below show that the CRDB bank has a 
higher customer deposits liability of Tshs. 2,019,937,000,000.00 in 2010 to Tshs. 
3,361,995,000.00 in 2014, where the NMB bank customer deposits liability were 
increased from Tshs. 1,812,647,000,000.00 in 2010 to Tshs. 2,974,068,000,000.00 in 
2014 at the same time the customer deposits liability for DCB bank were the least of 
Tshs. 64,941,498,399.00 in 2010 to Tshs. 92,916,405,000.00 in 2014. 
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Table 4.9: Customer Deposits Liability 
BANKS YEARS (Tshs) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
NMB 1,812,647,000,000 1,804,699,000,000 2,289,979,000,000 2,582,625,000,000 2,974,068,000,000 11,464,018,000,000 
CRDB 2,019,937,000,000 2,408,986,000,000 2,583,050,000,000 3,008,452,000,000 3,361,995,000,000 13,382,420,000,000 
DCB 64,941,498,399 64,963,720,158 71,645,881,000 84,132,600,000 92,916,405,000 378,600,104,557 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Figure 4.9: Customer Deposits Liability 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
4.2.1.10 Liquid Assets 
The table 4.10 below shows that the liquid assets of NMB bank had been increased 
from Tshs. 2,061,322,000,000.00 in 2010 to Tshs. 3,796,148,000,000.00 in 2014, 
where the CRDB bank were increased from Tshs. 2,237,360,000,000.00 in 2010 to 
Tshs. 3,999,881,000,000.00 in 2014, at the same time the liquid assets for DCB bank 
were increased from Tshs. 94,215,031,213.00 in 2010 to Tshs. 148,787,989,000.00 
in 2014. The graph for liquid assets can be seen on figure 4.10 below. 
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Table 4.10: Liquid Assets 
BANKS YEARS (Tshs) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
NMB 2,061,322,000,000 2,110,599,000,000 2,729,205,000,000 3,198,427,000,000 3,796,148,000,000 13,895,701,000,000 
CRDB 2,237,360,000,000 2,634,384,000,000 2,982,800,000,000 3,436,115,000,000 3,999,881,000,000 15,290,540,000,000 
DCB 94,215,031,213 95,401,917,295 112,507,416,000 136,644,998,000 148,787,989,000 587,557,351,508 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Figure 4.10: Liquid Assets 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
4.2.1.11 Total Deposits Liability 
On examining table 4.11 below, it can be observed that, the total deposits liabilities 
of CRDB is higher compared to other banks since were increased from Tshs. 
2,036,224,000,000 in 2010 to Tshs. 3,398,063,000,000.00 in 2014 followed by NMB 
bank where the total deposits liabilities were increased from Tshs. 
1,842,089,000,000.00 in 2010 to Tshs. 3,011,884,000,000.00 in 2014. Also the 
results from figure 4.11 below show that the total deposits liabilities for DCB bank 
were increased from Tshs. 79,165,500,523.00 in 2010 to Tshs. 113,105,180,000.00 
in 2014. 
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Table 4.11: Total Deposits Liability 
BANKS YEARS (Tshs) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
NMB 1,842,089,000,000 1,836,669,000,000 2,360,731,000,000 2,584,026,000,000 3,011,884,000,000 11,635,399,000,000 
CRDB 2,036,224,000,000 2,411,577,000,000 2,718,630,000,000 3,062,307,000,000 3,398,063,000,000 13,626,801,000,000 
DCB 79,165,500,523 81,072,141,149 90,933,319,000 102,730,362,000 113,105,180,000 467,006,502,672 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Figure 4.11 :Total Deposits Liability 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
4.2.1.12 Board Composition 
Board composition in this study refers to the number of membership held by the 
executive directors and that of non – executive directors. A control of board size is 
considered to be the natural logarithms of total board members. Whether the 
executive directors would have a great influence on board structure and their 
capacity to monitor management depend on the distribution of power between the 
chairperson of the board and the CEO (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). With 
reference to the table 4.12 below the executive directors for NMB and CRDB have 
an average of 2 members while NMB has 8 members for non – executive directors 
and CRDB has 10 for the whole five years at the same time the DCB bank has only 1 
executive director and 9 non- executive directors. 
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Table 4.12: Board Composition  
BANK ED NED TOTAL 
NMB 2 8 10 
CRDB 2 10 12 
DCB 1 9 10 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
Figure 4.12: Board Composition 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
4.2.1.13 Bank age 
The three banks have different years since they started their operations. I control the 
age of the bank since banks established for longer period might have enjoyed 
advantages, such as learning effect and a broader client base, over relative new 
banks. The control variable from the regression results show that age for both banks 
mostly appears to have positively coefficients, which implies that the age of the 
banks and its fee based activities does have a favourable impact on financial 
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soundness of the bank.  Larger banks might have enjoyed scale or scope economies 
that have positive effects on their performance. This can be seen by comparing DCB 
bank and others. Table 4.13 below shows NMB, CRDB and DCB were established in 
1997, 1996 and 2002 respectively but all have more than five years listed at the Dar – 
es – Salaam Stock Exchange.  
 
 Table 4.13: Bank Age 
BANK ESTABLISHMENT YEARS SERVED 
NMB 1997 - 2014 18 
CRDB 1996 - 2014 19 
DCB 2002 - 2014 13 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
Figure 4.13: Bank Age 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
4.2.1.14 Board / Committee Meetings 
There were four ordinary board meetings and other extra – ordinary meetings for all 
banks. The banks had divided their board committees into five, six and four for 
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NMB, CRDB and DCB respectively. NMB bank had a highest average of 12 
meetings with Board of Credit Committee compared to other committees, where 
CRDB bank had a highest average of 9 meetings with Board of Directors and Board 
of Credit Committee while DCB bank had a highest average of 9 meetings with 
Board of Audit & Risk Compliance Committee as shown in tables 4.14, 4.15, 4.16 
and figures 4.14, 4.15, 4.16 below respectively. 
 
Table 4.14: NMB Bank Board Committees 
BANK COMMITTEE YEARS ( Number) 
NMB 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
BOD 6 8 6 6 7 7 
BEC 4 2 0 0 0 1 
BARCC 5 6 4 4 4 5 
BHRRC 3 4 5 5 4 4 
BCC 15 10 11 14 11 12 
TOTAL 33 30 26 29 25 29 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
Figure 4.14: NMB Bank Board Committees 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Table 5.15: CRDB Bank Board Committees 
BANK 4COMMITTEE YEARS (Number) 
CRDB 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
BOD 10 9 8 8 8 9 
AC 5 5 5 5 6 5 
GHRC 5 5 3 5 5 5 
CC 11 11 9 10 6 9 
REC 0 0 1 1 1 1 
RC 0 0 3 4 4 2 
TOTAL 31 30 29 33 30 31 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
Figure 4.15 CRDB Bank Board Committees 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements  
 
Table 4.16: DCB Bank Board Committees 
BANK COMMITTEE YEARS (Number) 
DCB 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
BOD 8 8 8 8 10 8 
BARCC 10 9 10 7 9 9 
BSI 6 7 7 8 8 7 
BNHR 6 5 8 9 11 8 
TOTAL 30 29 33 32 38 32 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
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Figure 4.16: DCB Bank Board Committees 
 
Source: Banks Audited Financial Statements 
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
4.3.1 Results from Ratio Analysis 
4.3.1.1 Profitability  
4.3.1.1.1 Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on assets reflects the institution’s ability to use its assets productively in 
generating income compared to others. Thus the higher values of return on assets 
show that business is more profitable while the lower the return the lower the profit.  
An increasing of ROA indicates that the profitability of the company is improving 
conversely, a decreasing trend means that profitability is deteriorating. 
 
The return on assets which were measured from table 4.17 and figure 4.17 below 
show that the ROAs for NMB bank have been slightly increased from almost 2.56% 
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in 2010 to 4.01% in 2014, while the ROAs for CRDB bank have been fluctuating 
from 2.01% in 2010 to 2.31 in 2014 where the ROAs for DCB bank have decreased 
from 3.33% in 2010 to 1.63% in 2012 before being increased from 2.58% in 2013 to 
2.64%in 2014. This means that NMB bank has a good performance on utilizing its 
assets of an average of 3.48% followed by DCB bank with an average of 2.64% 
where the CRDB bank has utilized its assets on an average of 2.11% for  five years. 
This narrations also show that NMB bank had utilized its assets profitably compared 
to CRDB and DCB banks. 
 
Table 4.17: Return on Assets 
BANKS YEARS (%) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 AVERAGE 
NMB 2.56 3.31 3.47 4.07 4.01 3.48 
CRDB 2.01 1.34 2.53 2.36 2.31 2.11 
DCB 3.33 3.28 1.63 2.58 2.40 2.64 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
Figure 4.17 Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
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4.3.1.1.2 Gross Profit Margin (GPM) 
The gross profit margins for the three banks from table 4.18 below show that all 
banks have at least reached a gross profit margin above 50%. Higher values indicate 
that more cents are earned per shilling of income which is favorable because more 
profit will be available to cover non- production costs. But gross profit margin ratio 
analysis may mean different things for different kinds of business. For example, in 
case of large manufacturer, gross profit margin measures the efficiency of production 
process. For retailers it gives an impression of pricing, strategy of the business.  
 
In that case higher gross margin ratio means that the retailer charges higher markup 
on goods sold but in the case of bank industries higher gross profit margin means that 
the bank has minimized the operation costs as much as possible. Therefore from 
figure 4.18 below DCB bank had a highest gross profit margin of an average of 
64.58% and in fact reached a peak of 75.11% in 2010 compared to NMB and CRDB 
banks which had an average of 50.56% and 55.60% respectively.  
 
Table 4.18 Gross Profit Margin  
BANKS YEARS (%) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
NMB 33.69 57.96 54.21 55.67 51.26 50.56 
CRDB 52.96 47.02 59.31 59.96 58.73 55.60 
DCB 75.11 69.57 59.07 63.01 56.12 64.58 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
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Figure 4.18: Gross Profit Margin 
 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.3.1.1.3 Return on Equity (ROE) 
Return on equity or return on capital is the ratio of net profit of a business during a 
year to its stockholders’ equity during that year. It is a measure of profitability of 
stockholders’ investments.  
 
The table 4.19 below shows how the return on equity of NMB bank had been 
increased from 23.42% in 2010 to 29.26% in 2013 before been decreased to 27.44% 
in 2014 while both the ROE of CRDB and DCB banks had been decreased from 
32.89% and 21.37% in 2010 to 21.95% and 11.13% in 2014 respectively. In this case 
the investors of NMB bank will enjoy the higher returns of an average of 26.54% 
compared to the investors of CRDB and DCB banks who will have an average 
returns of 24.06% and 14.35% respectively for the five years as it has shown on 
figure 4.19 below.  
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However, relying solely on ROE for investment decisions is not safe because it can 
be artificially influenced by the management, for example, when debt financing is 
used to reduce share capital there will be an increase in ROE even if the income 
remains constant. 
 
Table 5.19: Return on Equity  
BANKS YEARS (%) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 AVERAGE 
NMB 23.42 25.26 27.31 29.26 27.44 26.54 
CRDB 32.89 18.03 24.86 22.58 21.95 24.06 
DCB 21.37 19.74 7.89 11.60 11.13 14.35 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
Figure 4.19: Returns on Equity  
 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
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4.3.1.1.4 Net Profit Margin (NPM) 
Net profit margin is the most basic profitability ratio that measures the percentage of 
net income of an entity to its net sales. It represents the proportion of sales that is left 
over after all relevant expenses have been adjusted. 
 
The table 4.20 below shows the net profit margin of NMB had a lowest net profit 
margin of 19.61% in 2010 and a highest net profit margin of 33.79% in 2011 
whereby the lowest net profit margin for CRDB is 14.73% in 2011 and the highest is 
21.86% in 2012 while the lowest net profit margin for DCB is 9.06% in 2012 and 
had a highest of 19.27% in 2010. This shows that NMB bank had done good 
performance on net profit margin of an average of 27.01% compared to other banks 
which have the average net profit margin of 19.14% and 14.21% for CRDB and 
DCB banks respectively for these five years. NMB bank had reached a maximum of 
33.79% net profit margin in 2011 as it can be seen in the figure 4.20 below, which 
was a very higher net profit margin compared to CRDB and DCB banks. 
 
Table 4.20: Net Profit Margin   
BANKS YEARS (%) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
NMB 19.61 33.79 25.44 28.49 27.71 27.01 
CRDB 20.56 14.73 21.86 19.91 18.64 19.14 
DCB 19.27 17.56 9.06 13.43 11.71 14.21 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
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Figure 4.20: Net Profit Margin 
 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.3.1.2 Efficiency 
Net Interest Margin (NIM) and Operational Efficiency Ratio in percentage (OER) 
were used to determine how efficient the banks in portfolio management and making 
loans. 
 
4.3.1.2.1 Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
The efficiency at managing their portfolios NMB showed a higher level of an 
average of efficiency (average NIM) of 8.35%. This indicates the higher interest 
margin and the more diversified performing assets on NMB bank compared to other 
banks due to the difference in loan administration cost. This is supported by the 
results from table 4.21 and figure 4.21 below which show that the NIM for NMB 
bank had been increased from 6.11% in 2010 to 9.32% in 2014. These results show 
that the more diversified performing assets gives good performance for NMB bank. 
It is, therefore NMB bank was more efficient in managing its portfolio than CRDB 
81 
and DCB banks. However, the CRDB bank had an average NIM of 5.24% while the 
DCB had only 0.10% for five years. 
 
 Table 4.21: Net Interest Margin   
BANKS YEARS (%) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
NMB 6.11 7.99 9.02 9.31 9.32 8.35 
CRDB 4.37 4.50 5.85 5.71 5.76 5.24 
DCB 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
Figure 4.21 Net Interest Margin 
 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.3.1.2.2 Operational Efficiency Ratio (OER) 
Table 4.22 below shows that CRDB bank has lowest average operations ratios of 
12.82% compared to NMB and DCB banks which the highest of 14.70% and 23.18% 
respectively, meaning that CRDB bank was more efficient in making loans than 
NMB and DCB banks. This implies that, CRDB bank has a positive impact on 
managing bank loans than other banks having higher efficiency ratios. 
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Simultaneously, the results also show that DCB bank is doing badly on securing 
loans and advances since the operational ratios were highly increasing from 18.74% 
in 2010 to 27.14% in 2014.  Therefore, when it comes to managing operations 
efficiently, the CRDB bank does a better job and this could be reflected in its lower 
operating efficiency ratio. These results tell me that NMB and DCB banks may have 
a more serious problem with underperforming loans compared to CRDB banks. This 
could be the results of NMB and DCB banks accepting riskier business, perhaps due 
to political pressures.  
 
Table 4.22 Operational Efficiency Ratio  
BANKS YEARS (%) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
NMB 13.28 13.31 15.35 15.89 15.69 14.70 
CRDB 11.45 12.06 13.85 13.05 13.69 12.82 
DCB 18.74 21.32 24.73 23.97 27.14 23.18 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
Figure 4.22 Operational Efficiency Ratio 
 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
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4.3.1.3 Capital Adequacy 
Banks are required by the BOT to maintain a minimum liquid asset ratio based on a 
percentage of their deposit liabilities as measured from time to time. In the normal 
course of operations, liquid assets used to meet the minimum liquid asset ratio should 
not be used or relied upon by a bank to meet normal demands for the payment of 
funds. This, in effect, provides deposit-taking banks with cover against the risk that 
their liquid liabilities run down faster than they can liquidate assets. Therefore, it was 
also the one of the objective of this study to assess whether there is a relationship 
between board composition and bank capital adequacy. Liquid assets to Deposit 
Liability ratio (La/Li) and Equity to Deposit Liability ratio (E/Li) were used to 
determine the financial soundness of a bank. 
 
4.3.1.3.1 Liquid Assets to Deposits Liability (La/Li) 
The table 4.23 and figure 4.23 below are about the liquid assets to deposits liability 
(La/Li), the results show that, on average, DCB bank performs better than other 
banks. This could imply that liquid assets of DCB bank with an average of 1:1.54 has 
a greater ability to cover deposit liability more than NMB and CRDB banks which 
have the average La/Li of 1:1.2 and 1:1.14 respectively. A possible explanation for 
this could be that, the DCB bank has a different capital strategy as compared to NMB 
and CRDB banks. The size of the bank matters here, larger banks are less liquid than 
smaller banks. This feature is because larger banks accept more deposits therefore 
they need a high cover against the risk that their liquid liabilities run down faster than 
they can liquidate assets. 
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Table 4.23: Liquid Assets to Deposits Liability  
BANKS YEARS ( Times) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
NMB 1.14 1.17 1.19 1.24 1.28 1.20 
CRDB 1.11 1.09 1.15 1.14 1.19 1.14 
DCB 1.45 1.47 1.57 1.62 1.60 1.54 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
Figure 4.23: Liquid Assets to Deposits Liability 
 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.3.1.3.2 Equity to Deposits Liability ( E/Li) 
The data results presented in table 4.24 and figure 4.24 below show the higher equity 
to deposits liability for DCB bank of average 25.37% than NMB and CRDB banks 
having the average of 15.92% and 10.33% respectively. This implies that DCB bank 
has higher equity in relation to deposits liability than NMB and CRDB banks. The 
results also show that DCB and NMB banks are unfavorably impact the financial 
soundness of the bank as measured by equity to deposits liability ratio. This result 
can be attributed to the larger extent by the funding capacity of these banks. This is 
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because the DCB and NMB banks can obtain equity capital from the shareholder 
which are mostly Government Institutions compared to CRDB bank which cannot 
has that access.  
 
Also the results show that as the bank size increase the E/Li ratio decreases. This is 
because the economies of scale and scope are present especially in larger banks, but 
beyond a crucial threshold, larger firms experience lower performance. As in the 
case of DCB bank as the bank expands it accept more deposits compared with NMB 
and CRDB banks.    
 
Table 4.24 Equity to Deposits Liability  
BANKS YEARS ( %) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
NMB 12.51 15.48 15.09 17.67 18.83 15.92 
CRDB 6.92 8.36 11.51 12.09 12.78 10.33 
DCB 18.72 20.38 26.62 31.13 30.00 25.37 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
Figure 4.24 Equity to Total Deposits Liability 
 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
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4.3.2 Results from Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis is a simple transformation of the data that explains the “basic 
characteristics such as central tendency, distribution and variability” (Zikmund et 
al, 2013, p. 484). This section of the study is devoted to presenting the results of the 
analysis performed on the data collected to test the propositions made in the study 
and answer the research questions. Analyses were carried out with the aid of the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences, (SPSS Version 16.0). The table 4.25 below 
shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the study.  
 
The return on asset ranges from 1.34% to 4.07%, with an average of 2.75%, while 
net profit margin has an average of 20.12%, with a minimum value of 9.06% to 
maximum value of 33.78%. The table also shows the average return on equity of 
21.65% with a minimum value of 7.89% to maximum value of 32.89% where the 
gross profit margin ranges from 33.69% to 75.11% with an average value of 56.91%. 
The results indicate that the net interest margin has a minimum value of 0.09% to a 
maximum value of 9.32% with an average of 4.56%, where the operational 
efficiency ratio ranging from 11.45% to 27.14% with an average of 16.90%. The data 
also represent the capital adequacy ratios which are equity capital to deposit 
liabilities (E/Li) and liquid assets to total deposits liabilities (LA/Li) ranging from 
6.92% to 31.13% and 1.09% to 1.62% with the average of 17.21% and 1.29% 
respectively.  
 
The number of executive directors on the board ranges from 1 to 2 members, number 
of non executive directors on the board rages from 8 to 10 members, numbers of 
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board meeting and numbers of committee meetings within a year ranges from 6 to 10 
times and 4 to 9 times respectively where the bank ages ranges from 9 to 19 years in 
operations. The average board size has been observed to have 10 directors where the 
average executive directors and non executive directors are 2 and 9 members 
respectively. 
 
Table 4.25 Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
ROA 15 1.34 4.07 2.7460 .80847 .654 
NPM 15 9.06 33.79 20.1180 6.66916 44.478 
ROE 15 7.89 32.89 21.6487 7.04615 49.648 
GPM 15 33.69 75.11 56.9100 9.43711 89.059 
NIM 15 .09 9.32 4.5627 3.61745 13.086 
OER 15 11.45 27.14 16.9013 5.05336 25.536 
E/Li 15 6.92 31.13 17.2060 7.33473 53.798 
LA/Li 15 1.09 1.62 1.2940 .19183 .037 
ED 15 1 2 1.67 .488 .238 
NED 15 8 10 9.00 .845 .714 
BM 15 6 10 7.87 1.246 1.552 
CM 15 4 9 5.93 1.668 2.781 
BA 15 9 19 14.67 3.086 9.524 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.3.3 Results from Correlation among Variables 
The focus of this study is to examine the relationship between board composition and 
financial performance. To measure the degree of relationship among the variables, 
Pearson correlation analysis is conducted to verify the existence of relationship 
between the independent variables i.e executive directors, non – executive directors, 
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board meetings, committee meetings and bank age with the dependent variables i.e 
ROA, NPM, ROE, GPM, NIM, OER, E/Li and LA/Li.  
 
The results of the two – tailed test on table 4.26 below show an insignificant and 
positive relationship between executive directors, committee meetings and bank age  
(r = 0.092), (r = 0.070) and (r = 0.060) respectively and return on assets for all banks. 
Moreover, similar results have revealed that non – executive directors has a 
statistically significant at 1% level (t = 0.003), whereby board meetings has a 
significant at 5% level (t = 0.016) and negative relationship with return on assets. 
However, all independent variables have no significant and negative related with net 
profit margin except for executive directors which show a statistically significant at 
1% level (t = 0.009) and bank age which show an insignificant and positive related 
with net profit margin at (r = 0.649)  and (r = 0.472) respectively. On the other hand, 
beside executive directors showing a statistically slightly significant at 1% level (t = 
0.001) and positive related with return on equity (r = 0.759), the bank age results 
show a statistically significant at 5% level (t = 0.043) and positive relationship with 
return on equity (r = 0.528).  The results also show non – executive directors and 
board meetings for all banks are insignificant and negative relationship with return 
on equity but slightly significant at 1% level (t = 0.004) and negative relationship 
with committee meetings.  
 
Regression results indicated on table 4.26 below show that a gross profit margin has 
statistically significant at 5% level (t = 0.019) and negative relationship with 
executive directors and no significant and negative relationship with bank age but 
89 
showing the insignificant and positive relationship between non – executive 
directors, board meetings and committee meetings with gross profit margin (r = 
0.226), (r = 0.247) and (r = 0.210) respectively. 
 
Net Interest Margin (NIM %) and Operational Efficiency Ratio (OER %) were used 
to determine how efficient were the banks in making loans and portfolio 
management. Concerning efficiency at managing their portfolios the regression 
results show an insignificant and positive relationship between board meetings and 
operational efficiency ratio (r = 0.208) and a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between committee meetings and operational efficiency ratio (r = 0.872 
p < 0.000), also a statistically significant at 1% and negative relationship between 
executive directors and bank age with operational efficiency ratio. Turning to the net 
interest margin, the results of the two – tailed test indicated that net interest margin 
has a significant at 5% level (t = 0.028) and 1% level (t = 0.011) and negative 
relationship between board meetings and committees meetings respectively. 
However, on the other hand the results show the significant at 1% level and positive 
relationship between executive directors and bank age with net interest margin (r = 
0.903 p < 0.000) and (r = 0.811 p < 0.000) respectively.  
 
To assess the relationship between the performance indicator for financial soundness 
of the banks (La/Li) and E/Li with board composition, regression analysis was also 
performed. The results of the analysis presented on the table 4.26 can be observed 
that, all banks have significant at 1% level and positive relationship between 
committee meetings and equity to deposits liability (r = 0.871 p < 0.000) and  not 
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significant but positive relationship between board meetings and equity to deposit 
liability (r = 0.057). However, the results show a statistically significant at 1% level 
and negative relationship between executive directors and equity to deposits liability. 
The results also show that the equity to deposits liability has a significant at 5% (t = 
0.033) and negative relationship with bank age and not significant and negative 
relationship with non – executive directors.  
 
The results also show a significant at 1% level and positive relationship between 
committee meetings and liquid assets to deposits liability (r = 0.858) but significant 
at 1% level and negative relationship between executive directors and bank age with 
liquid assets to deposits liability. The results also show an insignificant and positive 
relationship between board meetings and liquid assets to deposits liability (r = 
0.203), at the same time insignificant and negative relationship with non – executive 
directors.  
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Table 4.26: Pearson Correlations a Matrix 
 ROA NPM ROE GPM NIM OER E/Li LA/Li ED NED BM CM BA 
ROA Pearson Correlation 1             
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
 
15 
            
NPM Pearson Correlation .721 1            
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.002* 
15 
 
15 
           
ROE Pearson Correlation .480 .804 1           
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.070 
15 
.000* 
15 
 
15 
          
GPM Pearson Correlation .213 -.108 -.219 1          
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.446 
15 
.702 
15 
.432 
15 
 
15 
         
NIM Pearson Correlation .450 .823 .758 -.498 1         
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.092 
15 
.000* 
15 
.001* 
15 
.059 
15 
 
15 
        
OER Pearson Correlation -.017 -.598 -.795 .417 -.728 1        
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.951 
15 
.019** 
15 
.000* 
15 
.122 
15 
.002* 
15 
 
15 
       
E/Li Pearson Correlation .139 -.423 -.735 .368 -.567 .952 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.622 
15 
.116 
15 
.002* 
15 
.177 
15 
.027** 
15 
.000* 
15 
 
15 
      
LA/Li Pearson Correlation .032 -.567 -.763 .514 -.764 .977 .950 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.910 
15 
.027** 
15 
.001* 
15 
.050** 
15 
.001* 
15 
.000* 
15 
.000* 
15 15 
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Note.   * Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
         ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
ED Pearson Correlation .092 .649 .759 -.595 .903 -.909 -.815 -.946 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.743 
15 
.009* 
15 
.001* 
15 
.019** 
15 
.000* 
15 
.000* 
15 
.000* 
15 
.000* 
15 
 
15 
    
NED Pearson Correlation -.718 -.499 -.148 .226 -.364 -.158 -.322 -.150 .000 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.003* 
15 
.059 
15 
.597 
15 
.419 
15 
.183 
15 
.575 
15 
.242 
15 
.594 
15 
1.000 
15 
 
15 
   
BM Pearson Correlation -.607 -.475 -.310 .247 -.564 .208 .057 .203 -.313 .678 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.016** 
15 
.073 
15 
.261 
15 
.376 
15 
.028** 
15 
.457 
15 
.841 
15 
.469 
15 
.256 
15 
.005** 
15 
 
15 
  
CM Pearson Correlation .070 -.437 -.694 .210 -.633 .872 .871 .858 -.819 -.405 .030 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.805 
15 
.104 
15 
.004* 
15 
.452 
15 
.011* 
15 
.000* 
15 
.000* 
15 
.000* 
15 
.000* 
15 
.134 
15 
.916 
15 
 
15 
 
BA Pearson Correlation .060 .472 .528 -.455 .811 -.664 -.552 -.722 .870 .137 -.198 -.740 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.832 
15 
.076 
15 
.043** 
15 
.089 
15 
.000* 
15 
.007 
15 
.033** 
15 
.002* 
15 
.000* 
15 
.627 
15 
.479 
15 
.002* 
15 
 
15 
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4.3.4 Results from Multiple Regression Analysis 
4.3.4.1 Profitability 
Multiple regression analysis was carried out to test the relative strength of the 
relationship between values of dependent variables on profitability from those of 
independent variables.  
 
4.3.4.2 Return on Assets (ROA) 
The results of multiple regression analysis reflected on table 4.27 below show that 
the value of adjusted R square is 0.540, which shows that the return on assets has 
54% influences on board composition. Apart from that the results also show that the 
return on assets has insignificant and positive relationship on bank age (β = 0.455, p 
= 0.271). Otherwise the results show that executive directors, board meetings and 
committee meetings have negative effects on return on assets, but non – executive 
directors have a significant at 1% level (t – value = 0.012) and negative relationship 
with return on assets.  
 
These findings show that return on assets has no significant with many of the 
independents variables (executive directors, board meetings, committee meetings and 
bank age) except non – executive directors which shows a significant relationship, 
but has positive relationship with bank age with negative relationship with executive 
directors, non – executives, board meetings and committee meetings. 
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Table 4.27 Coefficientsa  
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 16.671 4.278  3.897 .004 
ED -1.821 .935 -1.099 -1.947 .083 
NED -1.056 .337 -1.104 -3.132 .012 
BM -.055 .181 -.084 -.302 .770 
CM -.455 .223 -.939 -2.041 .072 
BA .119 .102 .455 1.174 .271 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
    
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .839a .704 .540 .54833 
Source: Author Calculated  (2016) 
 
4.3.4.3 Return on Equity (ROE) 
Table 4.28 below shows that the value of adjusted R square is 0.609; this indicates 
that the return of equity has 61% impact on board composition. These results show 
that non – executive directors, committee meetings and bank age have negative effect 
on return on equity. Also the results show the return on equity has insignificant 
relationship on executive director and board meetings (β = 0.495, p = 0.366) and (β = 
0.134, p = 0.613) respectively.  
 
The findings show that return on equity has no significant on all independent 
variables (executive directors, non – executive directors, board meetings, committee 
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meetings and bank age) but has a positive relationship with executive director and 
board meetings with a negative relationship with other independent variables. 
 
Table 4.28: Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 74.237 34.360  2.161 .059 
ED 7.148 7.512 .495 .952 .366 
NED -4.206 2.709 -.504 -1.553 .155 
BM .760 1.450 .134 .524 .613 
CM -3.313 1.792 -.784 -1.849 .097 
BA -.884 .816 -.387 -1.084 .307 
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
    
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .865a .749 .609 4.40368 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.3.4.4 Gross Profit Margin (GPM) 
Table 4.29 below shows that the value of adjusted R square is 0.430, which shows 
that the gross profit margin has 43% impact on board composition. These results 
show that gross profit margin has no significant and positive relationship with bank 
age (β = 0.276, p = 0.539), however, has no significant and negative relationship 
with non – executive directors and board meetings while has shown statistically 
significant at 5% level (t – value = 0.019 and t – value = 0.051) and negative 
relationship with executive directors and committee meetings respectively. 
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These results indicate that executive directors, non – executive directors, board 
meetings and committee meetings have negative related with the performance 
indicator gross profit margin, at the same time show a gross profit margin with 
insignificant and positive related to the bank age.    
 
Table 4.29 Coefficients a 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 168.812 55.597  3.036 .014 
ED -34.845 12.156 -1.802 -2.867 .019 
NED -2.573 4.383 -.230 -.587 .572 
BM -.550 2.346 -.073 -.234 .820 
CM -6.525 2.899 -1.153 -2.251 .051 
BA .843 1.320 .276 .639 .539 
a. Dependent Variable: GPM 
    
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .796a .633 .430 7.12558 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.3.4.5 Net Profit Margin (NPM) 
Table 4.30 below shows that the value of adjusted R square is 0.629, which shows 
that the net profit margin has 63% impact on board composition. However, the 
results indicated below show that net profit margin has no significant to all 
independent variables except non – executive directors which shows statistically 
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significant at 5% level (t – value = 0.015) with negative relationship and committee 
meetings but positive relationship with executive directors (β = 0.132, p = 0.800) and 
board meetings (β = 0.228, p = 0.385). Moreover, when a bank becomes larger, some 
additional costs might also be included, such as more promotion costs as larger banks 
generally operate on a nationwide basis, while smaller banks are more regionally 
oriented. A negative coefficient for the control variable, business orientation (NPM) 
is a pointer to the higher costs and relatively higher salaries paid to skilled specialists 
and highly qualified professionals needed to run banks activities. 
 
Generally, the results from this point indicate that non – executive directors and 
committee meetings have no significant and negative related with the performance 
indicator net profit margin.  The results also show a net profit margin with 
insignificant and positive related to the executive directors, board meetings and bank 
age. 
 
Table 4.30 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 91.628 31.690  2.891 .018 
ED 1.811 6.929 .132 .261 .800 
NED -7.452 2.498 -.944 -2.983 .015 
BM 1.221 1.337 .228 .913 .385 
CM -2.872 1.652 -.718 -1.738 .116 
BA -.001 .752 .000 -.002 .998 
a. Dependent Variable: NPM 
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .873a .762 .629 4.06160 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.3.4.6 Efficiency 
The coefficients analysis of this study was carried out to test the relative strength of 
the relationship between values of dependent variables on efficiency (net interest 
margin and operational efficiency ratio from those of independent variables. 
 
4.3.4.7 Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
Table 4.31 below shows that the value of adjusted R square is 0.982, which shows 
that the net interest margin has 98% impact on board composition. Simultaneously, 
the results show that net interest margin has a strong and significant relationship at 
1% on bank age (β = 0.369, p = 0.01), with slightly significant at 5% and positive 
relationship on executive directors (β = 0.329, p = 0.017). In additional, the net 
interest margin has strongly significant at 1% (t – value = 0.000 and t – value = 
0.010) negative relationship with non – executive directors and committee meetings 
respectively while no significant and negative relationship with the board meetings. 
 
Examining the coefficients results from the table 4.31 below indicate that executive 
directors and bank age have positive relationship with net interest margin, whereas 
the results show that a net interest margin has negative relationship on three 
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dimensions of independent variables (non – executive directors, board meetings and 
committee meetings).  
 
Table 4.31: Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 18.498 3.814  4.850 .001 
ED 2.436 .834 .329 2.921 .017 
NED -2.199 .301 -.514 -7.312 .000 
BM -.090 .161 -.031 -.561 .588 
CM -.646 .199 -.298 -3.249 .010 
BA .432 .091 .369 4.772 .001 
a. Dependent Variable: NIM 
    
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .994a .988 .982 .48886 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.3.4.8 Operational Efficiency Ratio (OER) 
Table 4.32 below summarized the results of regression analysis for the value of 
adjusted R square showing 0.943, which means that the operational efficiency ratio 
has 94% impact on board composition. Furthermore, the results show the strong 
significant at 1% and positive relationship between operational efficiency ratio with 
bank age (β = 0.632, p = 0.001), whereby shows no significant and positive 
relationship with board meetings and committee meetings (β = 0.066, p = 0.518) and 
(β = 0.257, p = 0.146) respectively. 
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The results also reveal the operational efficiency ratio has statistically significant at 
1% level (t – value = 0.000) and negative relationship with executive directors and 
no significant and positive relationship with non – executive directors. 
 
These findings show that operational efficiency ratio has positive relationship with 
board meetings, committee meetings and bank age, but has negative relationship with 
executive director and non – executive directors. 
 
Table 4.32: Coefficients’a 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 26.104 9.396  2.778 .021 
ED -12.709 2.054 -1.227 -6.187 .000 
NED -1.102 .741 -.184 -1.488 .171 
BM .267 .397 .066 .673 .518 
CM .780 .490 .257 1.592 .146 
BA 1.034 .223 .632 4.637 .001 
a. Dependent Variable: OER 
    
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .982a .963 .943 1.20420 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.3.4.9 Capital Adequacy 
One of the objectives of this study was to assess the relationship between board 
composition and bank capital adequacy.  The ratios were used to measure the bank 
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capital adequacy in order to determine the financial soundness of the banks are liquid 
assets to deposit liability ratio (La/Li) and Equity to deposit liability ratio (E/Li).  
 
4.3.4.10 Liquid Assets to Deposits Liability Ratio (La/Li) 
On examining table 4.33 below, it can be observed that, the value of adjusted R 
square showing 0.976, which means that the liquid assets to deposit liability ratio has 
98% impact on board composition. However, the results show no significant and 
positive relationship between liquid assets to deposit liability ratio with board 
meetings and committee meetings (β = 0.037, p = 0.576 and β = 0.034, p = 0.753) 
respectively, whereby show strongly significant at 1% (t – value = 0.000) and 
positive relationship with bank age, at the same times shows negative relationship 
with executive directors. This implies that liquid assets to deposit liability ratio has 
negative relationship with executive directors and non – executive directors but 
positive relationship with board meetings, committee meetings and bank age. 
 
Table 4.33 Coefficientsa 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.116 .230  9.181 .000 
ED -.541 .050 -1.377 -10.743 .000 
NED -.053 .018 -.235 -2.935 .017 
BM .006 .010 .037 .580 .576 
CM .004 .012 .034 .324 .753 
BA .034 .005 .540 6.141 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: LA/Li 
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .992a .985 .976 .02954 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.3.4.11 Equity to Deposits Liability Ratio (E/Li) 
Regression results presented on table 4.34 below indicate that, the value of Adjusted 
R square is 0.941, which shows that equity to deposits liability has 94% influences 
on board composition. Further to that the results show that the executive and non – 
executive directors appear to be statistically significant at 1% level (t- value = 0.000) 
and 5% level (t- value = 0.020) respectively and negative relationship between equity 
to deposits liability. Also the coefficients results show that the equity to deposits 
liability has no significant and positive relationship with board meetings and 
committee meetings (β = 0.049 = p = 0.633 and β = 0.285, p = 0.119) respectively. 
However, the same results show strongly significant at 1% level and positive 
relationship with bank age (β = 0.861, p = 0.000).  
 
This implies that as the bank size increase the equity to deposits liability ratio 
decreases. This is because the economies of scale and scope are present especially in 
larger banks, but beyond a crucial threshold, larger bank experience lower 
performance and vice versa. 
 
These results show that equity to deposit liability ratio has significant and positive 
relationship with bank age but showing insignificant and positive relationship with 
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board meetings and committee meetings, at the same time showing significant and 
negative relationship with executive directors and non – executive directors. 
 
Table 4.34 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 38.292 13.956  2.744 .023 
ED -19.749 3.051 -1.314 -6.472 .000 
NED -3.101 1.100 -.357 -2.819 .020 
BM .291 .589 .049 .494 .633 
CM 1.256 .728 .285 1.725 .119 
BA 2.046 .331 .861 6.175 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: E/Li 
    
Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .981a .962 .941 1.78862 
Source: Author Calculated (2016) 
 
4.4 Discussion of the Findings 
The aim of this study is to empirically examine the impact of board composition on 
financial performance of the three banks listed at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock 
exchange. The most of findings show the evidences of relationship between 
independents variables with those of dependent variables. 
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In line with research question one (1) about the relationship between the board 
composition and bank performance, the results found to have the mixed answers. In 
some case there are positive relationships while in other cases there are negative 
relationships. In line with question two (2) on good combination of board 
composition which will turn to a high corporate governance hence high performance 
of the bank, the findings show positive relationship when the non – executive 
directors are more than executive directors. This means the executive directors will 
have less influences than non – executive directors when it comes to the issue of 
corporate governance of the bank.  
 
According to resource dependence theory, companies that heavily depend on external 
financing should have less inside directors in the board (Pfeffer, 1972, p. 222). 
Pearce II & Zahra confirmed that the larger board of directors and bigger outsiders 
(non – executive directors) representation in the board tend to be used in order to 
minimize the uncertainty surrounding strategy development and as a way to co-
opting with the environment (Pearce II and Zahra, 1992, p. 432). Independent (non – 
executive) director is considered to be the one, who is not currently employed by the 
company or has no psychological or economic dependence on its managers. A 
director, who has ties with the management of the company or represents the 
organization that does major business with the company cannot be considered 
independent (Baysinger and Butler, 1985, p.110).  
 
This study has also presented the empirical evidence that bank with more 
independent (non – executive) members in the board had a superior financial 
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performance. However, the study has also revealed that the proportion of insiders vs. 
outsiders vary from firm to firm depending on many factors (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985, p. 121). The reason for superior performance lies in the objective monitoring 
of the work done by management, mainly CEO.  
 
Weisbach tested the hypothesis that insider- and outsider-dominated boards of 
directors differently undertake decisions of CEO removal on the basis of 
performance. According to his empirical evidence, insider-dominated board less 
likely to remove the CEO than outsider-dominated board (Weisbach, 1988, p. 432).  
 
Thus, the outsider-dominated board adds value to the company by removing 
underperforming CEO; outsider-dominated board has more monitoring power, which 
increases with independence of the board. Monitoring provides the information that 
the board is using when deciding to remove the CEO (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, 
p. 97). A more recent study tells that boards with higher insider representation tend 
to be less effective in monitoring (Helland and Sykuta, 2005, p. 171). Rosenstein and 
Wyatt have continued the study of outsiders’ role in the board and have concluded 
that overall, the appointment of outside director increases firm value and thus 
increases the shareholder wealth (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990, p.190).  
 
An empirical study on the basis of UK banks showed a positive relationship between 
independent representatives in the board and financial efficiency, proving the fact 
that outsiders can bring valuable expertise and knowledge (Tanna et al., 2011, p. 
455). The independent board of directors is preferable and is explained by agency 
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theory. According to agency theory, independent board monitors management better 
and can make decisions that will be well timed. 
 
Harris & Raviv contradict to the previous opinion by saying that in reality companies 
would prefer insider-controlled board of directors. The reason is explained in the 
information importance that is available to insiders rather than to outsiders. If the 
cost of losing information is higher than the agency costs associated with inside 
control, the insider-controlled board is preferable (Harris & Raviv, 2008, p. 1830). 
The authors have also mentioned that outsiders bring value to the company by 
providing better expertise.  
 
However, the increasing number of outsiders will generate free-rider problems: their 
importance of contribution will be reduced and thus, they will contribute less and put 
in less effort. The optimal proportion of outsiders / insiders should be compiled in 
order to balance those two effects (Harris & Raviv, 2008, p. 1799). In support of 
these findings, a study made by Schooley et al. has tested the probability for 
shareholders’ filing as a measure of financial performance in connection with board 
composition. The authors have found that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the shareholder filing and the percentage of independent 
members in the board. Thus, independent (non – executive) members do not have 
enough knowledge about company that influences the poor decision-making 
(Schooley et al., 2010, p. 162). Earlier, Kiel & Nicholson came up with the same 
evidence and state that there is positive relationship between proportion of inside 
directors and financial performance (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003, p. 189). This support 
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stewardship theory by Donaldson (1990) that inside managers are good stewards to 
the company and will not make wrong decisions that will influence firm value 
decreasing. Overall, the corporate governance literature cannot provide consistent 
research findings and possible reason might be the complex relationships, which 
should be considered with multiple theoretical perspectives (Dalton et al., 1998, p. 
271). Further on, the meta-analyses of empirical studies of board composition 
showed no systematic relationship between board composition and financial 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998, p. 282). 
 
In line with research question three (3) about the effects of annual board meetings 
related to the financial performance, the findings confirmed that there is a positive 
impact of the number of board meetings on bank performance because larger the 
numbers of meetings larger will be the discussions on the problems and alternatives; 
hence it will lead to run business more efficiently. Agency theory suggests that 
corporate boards that meet more frequently have increased capacity to effectively 
advise, monitor and discipline management, and thereby improving corporate 
financial performance (Ntim & Osei, 2011). An important measure of corporate 
boards’ monitoring power and effectiveness is the frequency of board meetings 
(Jensen, 1993). Ntim & Osei (2001) found a statistically significant and positive 
association between the frequency of corporate board meetings and corporate 
performance.  
 
Consequently from this study, the results revealed that there is statistically significant 
and positive relationship between the board meetings and bank performance.  
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Furthermore, in order to have effective board meetings there must be some other 
meetings before the board. These are committee meetings which can be divided into 
at least four; like, audit committee which assists the board on monitoring internal 
control of the banks, human resources and remuneration committee which assists the 
board in fulfilling its oversight responsibility to shareholders by ensuring coherent 
remuneration policies and practices that fairly and responsibly reward staff, it also 
oversees all human resource policies within the organization. Risk committee, this 
assists the bank’s board of directors in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities with 
respect to the financial reporting process, the system of internal control, the 
performance of the internal audit, risk and compliance functions and the monitoring 
of compliance with laws and regulations of various regulatory agencies and credit 
committee which assists the board and oversees the management of credit risks by 
continuously reviewing the credit portfolio and credit standards together with decides 
on credit requests above the limits delegated to management. 
 
The numbers of committee meetings are considered to be an important attribute for 
their monitoring effectiveness. The results from this study have revealed that there is 
significantly and positive relationship between committee meetings and bank 
financial performance. The results show a statistically significant at 1% level and 
negative relationship between committee meetings and return on equity, at 1% level 
and negative relationship between committee meetings and net interest margin. 
Moreover, similar results also come out with slightly significant and positive 
relationship between committee meetings and operational efficiency ratio, equity to 
deposits liability and liquid assets to deposits liability.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the summary, conclusion, recommendations, limitation of the 
study and areas for further study. The main objective of the study was to analyze the 
relationship between the board compositions of the three selected banks listed at the 
Dar – es – Salaam Stock Exchange and their financial performance. 
 
5.2 Summary of the Findings 
In this section of my study, I have presented the results of the statistical tests being 
conducted. One of the first choices of statistical analyses is Pearson correlations. I 
have based my assumption on the relationship between board composition indicators 
and ordinary least square regression model was used. The Pearson correlations 
analysis showed insignificant results. Thus, I have decided to transform the data into 
natural logarithms in order to improve the normality and linearity of data. After 
doing this, the model improved and showed significant results. The Pearson 
correlations regression analysis showed that in some cases executive directors, non – 
executive directors, board meetings, committee meetings and bank age are 
significant correlated and can explain the dependent variables, although in other case 
the same showed no significant.  
 
Furthermore, I have conducted multiple regression analysis.  I have followed the 
same steps as in Pearson correlations analysis, since the first test without transformed 
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data was insignificant. The second test showed that executive directors, non – 
executive directors, board meetings, committee meetings and bank age, are 
significant and negatively or insignificant and positive related with bank financial 
performance. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and 
controlled by distributing the rights and responsibilities among different participants. 
It has a lot to do with economic development of a firm business, it insures that the 
firms are run in an open and honest manner. Therefore, corporate governance is the 
procedure by which firms are controlled to establish a good relationship among the 
stakeholders and establish a healthy competition in the economy.  
 
This study therefore seeks to analyze the relationship between board composition and 
financial performance in the context of three banks listed at the Dar – es – Salaam 
Stock Exchange. Specifically, it examined the impact of executive directors, non – 
executive directors, board meetings, committee meetings, bank age on bank 
performance. Bank performance is measured by means of profitability using ROA, 
ROE, GPM and NPM variables, efficiency using NIM and OER and capital 
adequacy using LA/Li and E/Li variables. 
 
Regression analysis indicated mixed results. The study findings show that 
independent variables have no significant impact with return on assets except non – 
executive directors which shows a significant impact, but has positive relationship 
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with bank age. The study also shows that the return on assets (ROA) has negative 
relationship with executive directors, non – executives, board meetings and 
committee meetings. In other ways the findings show that many of the independent 
variables have no significant impact on return on equity (ROE) but have positive 
relationship with executive director and board meetings with a negative relationship 
with other independent variables. 
 
With respect to gross profit margin the study finds the negative relationship with 
executive directors, non – executive directors, board meetings and committee 
meetings.  The results also show an insignificant and positive related between bank 
age and gross profit margin (GPM). The results on the net profit margin show no 
significant and negative related with non – executive directors and committee 
meetings while the executive directors, board meetings and bank age show 
insignificant and positive impact to net profit margin (NPM). 
 
Concerning board composition and bank efficiency, the study finds that net interest 
margin has highly significant and positive impact with executive directors and bank 
ages, whereas at the same time the results show the net interest margin highly 
significant and negative impact with non – executive directors and committee 
meetings. In other way round, executive directors have significant and positive effect 
on operational efficiency (OER) whereas bank age has significant and negative 
impact on bank age. But the results also show non – executive directors, board 
meetings and committee meetings have no impact on operational efficiency ratio 
(OER). 
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With respect to liquid assets to deposit liability ratio (La/Li) and Equity to deposit 
liability ratio (E/Li), the study finds that executive directors and non – executive 
directors have highly significant impact and negative related with liquid assets to 
deposit liability ratio but the board meetings and committee meetings have no impact 
and positive related with liquid assets to deposit liability, where bank age has highly 
significant impact and positive related with La/Li. On other side the results show that 
equity to deposit liability ratio has significant and positive relationship with bank 
age, whereas board meetings and committee meetings have no impact on equity to 
deposit liability with positive related but the results also show significant and 
negative relationship with executive directors and non – executive directors. 
 
Therefore the study finds little evidence to suggest that, there is pure linear positive 
or negative relationship between board composition and bank financial performance 
on the three banks listed at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock Exchange.   
 
5.4 Recommendation 
The Cadbury Report (1992), Hampel Report (1998) and OECD principles 
recommended that boards should be comprised of a majority of non-executive 
directors. The DSE listing requirements in the secondary capital markets have also 
incorporated the above principles in their governance practices, non – executive 
directors bring independence of mind and judgment on issues of strategy and 
governance on running the business, and also see themselves as assisting in 
enhancing prosperity of the companies and play an important part in improving the 
performance of the business. The results also imply that to be effective, a board must 
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have the right mix of skills and experience and work together as a team, which will 
encourage diverse and healthy debate in the interest of the investors and the 
company. 
 
Therefore, this study makes general recommendation that;  
i) Large but representative board size should be encouraged.  
ii) The composition of non – executive directors as members of the board should be 
sustained and improved upon.  
iii) As board of directors are supposed to ensure monitoring the activities to increase 
firm performance, the composition of non - executive directors as members of the 
board should be increased so that it could have good representative.  
 
Also the study makes specific recommendations as follows; 
 Management of the Banks: 
i) Ensure gender balance 
ii) Get independent members from the right sources 
iii) Orient board members to their role 
iv) Consider a large pool of potential board members 
v) Consider the unique value of each member and how as a group they 
complement the capabilities of the founder/owner as well as the value of their 
own and other resources 
vi) Expose board members to risk management, including basic control systems 
and processes 
vii) Evaluate the performance of board members and the board annually 
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viii) Have a simple board manual to guide members on their role and board 
processes, appraisal and refreshing 
ix) There should be a board/governance training programme targeting sitting and 
potential board members 
x) Provide a database with the profile of potential board members within and 
outside the country 
 
 Bank / Company Regulatory Authorities (BOT/ DSE) 
Provide banks or companies with general guidance on governance even before the 
specified requirement or the firm capacity to regulate and supervise is in place. This 
should include the composition and functions of the board and other basic risk 
management tools / processes. 
 
Finally, the findings do not suggest that improving bank performance is simply a 
matter of having good board representatives, board meetings, committee meetings 
and so forth but rather, the causes of bank performance seem to be found in wider 
economic and regulatory issues and commitments, although this needs much fuller 
investigation than has not been possible in this study. 
 
5.5 Limitations of the Study 
First, the study was based on the banks listed more than five years at the  
Dar – es – Salaam Stock Exchange which may limit the generalization of results to 
other jurisdictions such those which are no more than five years or to the non-listed 
banks. The population from which the sample is drawn was all the listed companies 
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therefore, results of this study may not be generalised to other non-banks companies 
listed at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock Exchange and none listed. 
 
Secondly, the study integrated only eight important dependent variables; return on 
assets, return on equity, gross profit margin, net profit margin, net interest margin, 
operational efficiency ratio, equity to deposits liability and liquid assets to deposits 
liability, while the study tested only five important independent variables which 
include; executive directors, non – executive directors, board meetings, committee 
meetings and bank age. However, there is a variety of other important governance 
variables that have important effects on financial performance and which might also 
strongly influence the relationship between board composition and firm financial 
performance are not included in this framework, such as experiences, gender (female 
members), ages of board members, international board member, education, employee 
representatives, CEO duality and others dependent variables such as cost to income, 
non – funded income to total income, loans to total deposits, non – performing loans 
to total loans and advances and debt to total assets 
 
Thirdly, the study has assessed the interactive relationship between the banks 
financial performance and board composition; however, also acknowledged the 
possibility that board composition decisions characteristics can influence the 
individual financial performance variables. 
 
Finally, the board composition developed on these banks is at different levels. NMB 
bank has got five (5) board committees, two executive directors, eight non – 
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executive directors and eighteen (18) years in operations while CRDB bank has six 
(6) board committees, two executive directors, ten non – executive directors and 
nineteen (19) years in operations and DCB has got four (4) board committees, one 
executive directors, nine non – executive directors and thirteen (13) years in 
operations. These different may in some case affect the end results of this study since 
some can have good performances because of its experiences while others will lack 
this opportunity. Despite the above limitations, the quality of the study was not 
compromised. The study has made an immense contribution to the existing body of 
knowledge, especially in the area of corporate governance on listed banks in 
Tanzania which has not been fully exploited. 
 
5.6 Areas for Further Studies 
This study would like to suggest further research in this area. It should be noted that 
this study has only covered the period from 2010 to 2014, with a sample of three (3) 
banks listed out of five (5) listed banks and other many banks operating in Tanzania 
and 14 firms listed at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock Exchange; hence, the validity of 
the findings interpreted in this study is limited to the scope of the data and the 
condition of economics for the period of the data and the governance variables. 
Furthermore, it would be very valuable to conduct the same research but being able 
to include all banks operating in Tanzania or by considering all listed firms at the 
DSE and using other variables like experiences, gender (female members), 
international board member, education, employee representatives and CEO duality 
for independent variables while for dependent variables cost to income, non – funded 
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income to total income, loans to total deposits, non – performing loans to total loans 
and advances and debt to total assets can be tested.  
 
Finally, doing that a researcher can make an analysis based on the whole population 
of banks operating in Tanzania or all companies listed at the Dar – es – Salaam Stock 
Exchange with full variables. This way will increase the amount of companies in the 
segment and provide more accurate results. Also a researcher can even test the 
relationship between independent variables with those of dependent variables by 
considering all banks without picking which are listed and which not listed at the Dar 
– es – Salaam Stock Exchange. However, I believe my study can be reasonably 
generalized to the rest of the companies and a study might receive the same results 
and make the same conclusion. 
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